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 ABSTRACT 
 
FEASIBILITY OF PROPOSED MONETARY UNIONS IN THE EASTERN AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION 
By  
Steven K. Buigut 
 
December 2006 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Neven T. Valev 
Major Department: Economics 
 
The dissertation assesses the suitability of countries in the Eastern and 
Southern Africa region for a monetary union. Using VAR techniques the symmetry of 
the underlying structural shocks is analyzed. The results indicate that supply and 
demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for 
forming a region-wide currency union at the moment. Although economic shocks are 
not highly correlated across the entire region, we tentatively identify three sub-
regional clusters of countries that may benefit from a currency union. We find some 
tentative evidence that some, though not all, sub-regions may benefit from a link to 
the Euro. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across 
the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more 
favorable conditions for a monetary union.  
Using a Barro-Gordon type model, it is shown that forming a monetary union 
yields net benefits if output shocks are similar across member countries and if one or 
 xi
 more countries in the union can serve as anchors. In addition it is shown that the 
opportunistic objectives of one country’s policymakers are kept in check at the union 
level by other members with disparate objectives. Hence monetary union can improve 
the monetary policy for its members if the pressures on the individual central banks 
are dissimilar. Calibrating the model to evaluate the proposed monetary union in the 
East African Community, it is found that central bank uncertainty would be a 
significant aspect in the net welfare effect of monetary union. An examination of the 
EAC countries also shows a fair degree of linkages. Intra-regional trade is substantial. 
The benefits from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty would be 
substantial and growing. Though symmetry of shocks is still low, implementation of a 
protocol on factor mobility under discussion would help improve labor mobility. 
However though some progress has been made there is still need for more 
convergence before monetary union could be implemented. 
 
 xii
 Essay One: Is The Proposed East African Monetary Union an Optimal Currency 
Area? A Structural Vector Autoregression Analysis 
 
Introduction 
The treaty of 1999 to revive the defunct East African Community (EAC) 
ratified by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania1 came into force in July 2000 with the 
objective of fostering a closer co-operation in political, economic, social, and cultural 
fields. To achieve this, an East Africa Customs Union protocol was signed in March 
2004. A Common Market, a Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation of 
East Africa states is planned. Though the question of a monetary union has been 
discussed in the political arena there has been no corresponding empirical study on 
the economic viability of such a union. To fill this gap this article assesses whether 
the political force driving the EAC towards a monetary union has economic basis. 
As Mundell (1961)  and McKinnon (1963) describe, the member countries of 
a monetary union have a common monetary policy and therefore they cannot use 
monetary and exchange rate policies to react to country-specific shocks. The loss of 
independent monetary and exchange rate policy is problematic if the member 
countries experience asymmetric shocks so that different members need different 
policies at the same time. This is even worse if adjustment to shocks is hampered by 
downward wage rigidity, immobile labor, and the absence of agreements for fiscal 
transfers between member countries. In addition, fiscal policy, which is the only 
stabilization tool available, is hindered by high government debts, which are typical in 
developing countries including the ones studied here. Thus, this paper investigates the 
feasibility of a monetary union in the East African Community by focusing on the 
                                                 
1 The old EAC collapsed in 1977 and was officially dissolved in 1983. Rwanda and Burundi 
have applied to join the new community and are included in the study.  
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 symmetry of the underlying shocks across the member economies as a precondition 
for forming an optimal currency area (OCA).2
A monetary union can have important benefits. By eliminating currency 
conversion costs and exchange rate risks between the member states it can spur intra-
regional trade (Rose and Stanley 2005). It is also possible that the supranational 
monetary authority could achieve a greater credibility for setting prudent monetary 
policy compared to the central banks of the individual countries (see Guillaume and 
Stasavage 2000). Expectations of financial stability contribute to financial deepening, 
greater investment, and faster economic growth. Such institutional credibility gains 
are particularly important in developing countries with relatively short history of 
independent policy making. Finally, a monetary union reduces the need to maintain 
large liquid foreign exchange reserves that can be redirected to generate greater 
returns.  
The methodology used here follows Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) who are 
among the first to identify the underlying structural shocks using the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) technique developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989). They 
measure the incidence of asymmetric demand and supply shocks across members of 
the former European Community (EC) and compare them with the ones prevailing in 
the United States. Since then, a large literature has applied this methodology or a 
related approach to different compositions of country groups in Europe. More recently 
a number of studies have used the same approach to investigate the situation in 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and East Asia. Fidrmuc and 
                                                 
2 Introduced by Mundell (1961), an OCA is defined as an optimal geographic domain of a 
single currency, or of several currencies, whose exchange rates are irrevocably pegged and might be 
unified (Mongelli 2002). Optimality is defined in terms of several OCA properties, including the 
mobility of labor, wage and price flexibility, diversification in production and fiscal integration, among 
others. Sharing the above properties reduces the cost of abandoning exchange rate adjustments within 
the currency area.  
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 Korhonen (2001) and Frenkel and Nickel (2002) use VAR to assess the similarity of 
shocks between the countries of the Euro area and the CEECs. Studies that have 
applied the approach to East Asia (e.g., Yuen and Ling 2001; Zhang, Sato, and 
McAleer 2004) identify tentative groupings of East Asian economies with potential 
for monetary union. 
Although there are a number of economic blocks considering monetary union 
like the African Monetary Zone (WAMZ),3 the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC),4 and the EAC, application of this methodology in Africa has 
been limited. Fielding and Shields (2001) modify the Blanchard and Quah 
methodology in order to estimate a structural VAR for a small open economy. They 
identify and compare economic shocks to different members of the two CFA 
monetary unions, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)5 and 
the region of the Central Bank of Equatorial Africa (BEAC).6 Their results indicate 
that if the policy response to inflation shocks is immediate and inflation is all that 
matters then one currency would suffice. However, the pattern of output shocks 
suggests a need to redraw the internal boundaries of the Franc zone. Using a model of 
government financing needs, Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo (2005) find that fiscal 
heterogeneity is critical in shaping regional currency union in the ECOWAS7 region. 
A study by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) investigates the desirability of a monetary 
union among the countries of the SADC to gauge which countries are suited to enter a 
South Africa Monetary Union. They employ a Generalized Auto-Regressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity model to assess the share of the variation in real 
                                                 
3 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.  
4 Angola, Botswana, D.R. Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note: Seychelles pulled out 2004. 
5 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Togo, Mali, and Niger. 
6 Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Central Africa R., Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. 
7 ECOWAS includes the WAMZ, UEMOA, Cape Verde and Liberia. 
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 exchange rates vis-à-vis South Africa that can be explained by the divergence in 
monetary and fiscal policies. The results from this model indicate low degrees of 
symmetry of the real exchange rate shocks across most of these countries.  
There is, however, a glaring paucity of empirical work for the East African 
Community. A lone study, Mkenda (2001), employs a Generalized Purchasing Power 
Parity (GPPP) model to analyze the suitability of the EAC for a monetary union. The 
results from Mkenda’s study indicate that the real exchange rates between the EAC 
countries are cointegrated during the period from 1980 to 1998, suggesting that the 
EAC is an optimum currency area. The limitation of this approach is that movements 
in macroeconomic variables reflect the combined effects of shocks and responses 
(Angeloni and Dedola 1999). Hence this methodology does not distinguish 
disturbances from responses. The identification scheme due to Blanchard and Quah 
(1989) is one way to achieve this distinction. This study is the first to assess the 
similarity of underlying shocks in the EAC based on the VAR approach. The rest of 
the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a description of several key 
features of the economies studied here, Section 3 introduces the empirical 
methodology, Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
Descriptive Analytics 
 
Table 1 shows that in broad terms the structure of the EA economies is similar 
with agriculture contributing a large part of GDP and exports. Kenya has a relatively 
larger manufacturing sector and exports more manufactures. Manufactures dominate 
the region’s imports and all the countries are oil importers. These structural 
similarities would suggest also similarity of economic shocks.  
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 However, although all the EA countries export primary commodities, reliance 
on specific commodities varies. Kenya’s top two exports, tea and horticulture, 
comprise 36% of its total exports, whereas Tanzania relies on gold (43.7% of exports) 
and fish (11.9% of exports). Uganda depends on coffee and fish (35% of exports), 
Burundi on coffee (69.5% of exports) and tea (20.3% of exports), and coffee forms 
the bulk (25%) of Rwanda’s exports (IMF 2003/2004). Heavy reliance on a narrow 
range of exports shows a limited ability to cope with shocks. The differences in 
primary commodity exports across the countries suggest that they are affected by 
different economic shocks. These primary products are however prone to very high 
price volatility, raising the cost of exchange rate volatility risk. One currency may 
thus offer substantial benefits in eliminating volatility risk in trade.   
 
Table 1. Structure of the Economy for East African Countries (2001) 
Share of GDP (percentage) Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Agriculture  50 19 41 45 36 
Manufacturing .. 13 10 7 10 
Services  31 63 38 39 43 
Share of Exports (percentage)      
Food  91 59 .. 70 69 
Agric. Raw materials 8 9 .. 13 15 
Manufactures 0 21 .. 15 7 
Imports (percentage)      
Food 23 14 .. 16 12 
Fuels 12 22 .. 8 16 
Manufactures 60 60 .. 72 67 
Source: World Development Indicators (2003). Note: (..) not available. 
 
Large trade volumes between the countries might contribute to more similar 
economic conditions despite the differences in specialization. Table 2 shows the intra-
region trade and trade with major developed countries. Intra-regional trade is not 
insignificant. For example, the EA region absorbs 20% of Kenya’s exports, with 
Uganda being the single most important destination for its goods. Uganda, Rwanda, 
and Burundi source a substantial portion of their imports from EA, especially from 
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 Kenya. In addition unrecorded (informal) trade between these countries is substantial. 
Estimates show that informal trade between Tanzania and its neighbors was over 57% 
of recorded trade (Ackello-Ogutu and Echessa 1998) during the same period. 
Including informal trade, intra-region trade compares favorably with trade with Euro-
bloc, and exceeds that with U.K. or U.S. Improvements in infrastructure are expected 
to significantly increase intra-regional trade (Longo and Sekkat 2004). High trade 
links with the Euro-bloc suggest that pegging a common EAC currency to the euro, as 
is the case with the CFA zone, might be beneficial. We explore the feasibility of this 
option in the following sections.  
 
Table 2. Trade Relations of East African Countries (2003): Exports (Imports) as 
Percentage of Total Exports (Imports) 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Burundi  0.8a; 0.0b 0.5; 0.7 1.7; 0.0 1.9; 0.0 
Kenya 0.1; 14.4  0.1; 23.3 4.6; 5.0 14.7; 26.0 
Rwanda 5.6; 0.5 3.1; 0.0  0.5; 0.0 3.9; 0.0 
Tanzania 0.1; 11.7 4.2; 1.1 0.0; 1.4  1.1; 0.8 
Uganda 2.0; 5.9 12.6; 2.1 0.3; 6.3 1.0; 0.3  
East Africa 7.8; 32.5 19.9; 3.2 0.5; 31.0 6.2; 5.2 19.7; 26.9 
U.S.A 1.6; 2.1 9.4; 5.2 1.7; 2.4 2.5; 3.1 2.4; 5.7 
U.K. 16.3; 0.8 12.5; 7.4 0.3; 1.6 5.2; 4.4 6.4; 6.3 
Euro-bloc 12.0; 28.4 19.0; 15.3 10.0; 22.4 24.6; 22.4 21.5; 14.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculated from the Direction of Trade statistics (2004) published by the 
IMF. Note: a (b); 0.8% (0%) of Kenya’s exports (imports) go to (come from) Burundi.  
 
 Asymmetry of economic shocks is less of a problem for the feasibility of a 
monetary union if labor is mobile between the countries, if wages are flexible, or if 
the countries can engage in effective independent or common stabilization fiscal 
policies. Though there are no statistics on cross-country labor flows in the region, 
traditionally labor mobility is considered to be high, with Kenya and Uganda being 
major sending countries to destinations such as South Africa and Botswana (Adepoju 
2001). The indication, however, is that the region does not yet have a free flow of 
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 labor. Currently mobility is undermined by security concerns and high unemployment 
in these countries (ECA 2004). Using spending on education as a measure of the 
potential for human development and labor mobility, they find that spending on 
education has had low priority.8 Article 104 of the EAC treaty envisions free 
movement of labor and right of establishment of residence as one of the goals of the 
community. The community has established a committee to look into implementation 
of this objective through harmonization of labor laws, travel documents, and 
education policies among others. A common language and many cross-border 
communities also suggest possibilities for more mobility in the future. 
It is hard to generalize on wage flexibility due to the dual nature of the labor 
market. There tends to be less flexibility in the formal sector than in the informal 
sector. The three core countries have minimum wage laws though with varying 
degrees of enforceability. The formal sector in Kenya has a strong union structure that 
over the last few years succeeded in raising real wages after an extended period in 
which inflation eroded real wage (IMF 2003). However there is a large informal 
sector not covered by unions and minimum wage laws. High labor growth and 
unemployment is another source of downward pressure on wages. Due to its socialist 
leaning past, Tanzania’s wage structure has previously been set by government, 
though reforms are underway to allow for more market determined wage structure and 
bargaining.  
Table 3 shows the kind of fiscal burden the countries face. All of them still 
need to improve on their public debt management. Kenya relies less on foreign aid 
and has the least external debt as percentage of GNI. However this advantage is 
compromised by its relatively higher domestic debt (35% of total debt). This will 
                                                 
8 Kenya seems to be better placed with an adult literacy level of 84%. The other countries 
have literacy levels ranging from only 50% in Burundi, 68% in Rwanda and Uganda to 76% in 
Tanzania (Source: WDI, 2003).  
 7
 hinder fiscal response to shocks, or any form of fiscal transfers between the EAC 
countries.  
Synchronicity of shocks thus becomes crucial since the alternative ways of 
adjustment related to wage flexibility, labor mobility, and intra-regional transfers are 
limited at the moment.  
 
Table 3. Debt and Aid Dependency (Percentage) Indicators for East African 
Countries (2001) 
Debt & Aid Kenya Burundi Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Total external debt/Exports 192.9 1842.7 787.3 451.0 552.6 
Total External debt/GNI 51.9 156.8 76.3 71.9 67.4 
Total debt service/Exports 15.4 39.8 11.3 10.3 7.4 
Domestic debt/Total debt 35 8.3 13.2 - 7.7 
Aid per capita 15 19 33 36 34 
Aid as percentage of GNI 4.0 19.3 17.3 13.3 14.1 
Aid as percentage of cross  
capital formation 
31.1 274.3 92.7 77.7 40.5 
Source: Global Development Finance, (2003); World Development Indicators (2003). 
 
Methodology and Data 
 
Methodology 
The aim of the remainder of the paper is to identify and compare 
macroeconomic shocks to the East African countries and to those of the EMU 
countries, the U.K., and the U.S. We focus on shocks to aggregate output growth and 
inflation using a VAR model. These are the two most important macro economic 
indicators across Africa (Bayoumi and Ostry 1997). A VAR is a statistical method 
that allows us to estimate how an unpredictable disturbance affects other variables in 
the economy. In the VAR we assume that the changes in the log of real output ( tyΔ ) 
and price level ( ) result from two types of shocks: demand and supply shocks. tpΔ
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 When is stationary, this process can be represented by an infinite moving 
average representation, 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ≡
t
t
t p
y
X
 .....22110 +Α+Α+Α= −− ttttX εεε  =                                      (1.1) ∑∞
=
−
0i
iti
i AL ε
where L is the lag operator, Ai are 2x2 matrices representing the impulse response 
functions of the shocks to the elements of the vector Xt, i.e., these transmit the effects 
of the shocks to the variables, and εdt and εst are independent white noise demand and 
supply disturbances, normalized so that Var(εt)=I. Because εdt and εst are not 
observed, to identify this model we estimate a finite version VAR(p) with a lag length 
(p) chosen such that the residuals approximate white noise. Tests show that the 
optimal lag length is two. Thus we estimate: 
tttt eXXKX +Φ+Φ+= −− 2211 ,                                                                           (1.2) 
The vector of residuals ( ) obtained in (1.2) is a composite of demand and 
supply shocks. We need to decompose these residuals into the pure structural demand 
and supply shocks (
te
dtε and stε ). Appendix A describes how to achieve that in 
technical terms. The identification method is based on the Aggregate Demand-
Aggregate Supply (AD-AS) framework due to Blanchard and Quah (1989) and 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). In this framework, the short-run aggregate supply 
curve is upward sloping due to sticky wages. A higher price level lowers the real 
wage, inducing higher employment and raising output. In the long-run real wages 
adjust to price changes so that the long-run aggregate supply curve is vertical at the 
full employment level of output. The aggregate demand curve is downward sloping 
both in the short and the long-run to reflect the assumption that lower prices boost 
demand. Supply shocks, such as those originating from changes in technology, have 
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 long-run permanent effects on the full employment level of output. They reduce 
prices and increase output. On the other hand, the effect of a permanent shock to the 
aggregate demand is a short-term rise in output that gradually returns to its initial 
level as the real wage adjusts. The long-term effect is only a permanent increase in 
prices. In that framework, we have enough information to obtain an impulse response 
function (A0) and recover the structural shocks. Two series of exogenous shocks are 
obtained for each country and the correlations of these shocks are computed. 
 
Data 
The main data source used in this study is the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. This is supplemented by comparable figures from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the African Development Bank Country Statistics. 
Annual data for the five Eastern African countries, the U.K., the U.S. and the EMU 
countries9 cover the sample period from 1970 to 2001. Real GDP growth is used to 
measure changes in output, while changes in the implicit GDP deflator represent price 
changes, both rebased to 100 in 1995 for all countries. For each country we use the 
first difference of the natural logs of real GDP and the implicit GDP deflator for 
estimation. Although they are available, it is worth noting that the quality of reported 
data by these countries, specifically Rwanda and Burundi during the civil unrest in 
these countries, is questionable, particularly in the period from 1994 to 1998. Thus, 
we re-estimate10 some of our results excluding these two countries. 
                                                 
9 To represent EMU we select the core countries of Germany, France and Italy, and in addition 
we use a GDP-weighted aggregate of all EMU countries. 
10We carry out a stability test using Chow’s forecast test due to limiting post-war sub sample 
size. We find a significant war-effect for level data for both Rwanda and Burundi, but only Rwanda for 
first differenced data. We report results based on the full sample and discuss the effect on the results 
when we use pre-war data (up to 1993) for these countries. We exclude these two countries in the sub-
period analysis. 
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 Results 
 
Identifying Supply and Demand Shocks 
The time series properties of the variables were investigated using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and it was found that both variables are I(1). Therefore 
the first differences of the variables are used to ensure stationarity. Tests for stability 
show that the eigenvalues of (F) in (A6) all lie inside the unit root circle (see 
Appendix B). The VAR is thus covariance stationary. For estimation of the empirical 
two-variable VAR the number of lags is set to two in all cases since both the SBIC 
and AIC statistics indicate that all models have an optimal lag length of one or two. 
From the estimated VAR the underlying supply and demand shocks were recovered as 
described in Appendix A.  
The sizes of the underlying demand and supply shocks constrained to be of 
unit variance are graphed in Figure 1. The shocks vary from country to country in 
magnitude. Tanzania has experienced the widest swings in demand shocks, while 
Rwanda has the widest range in supply shocks.  
 
Figure 1. Demand and Supply Shocks, EAC, 1973 to 2001 
Figure 1a. Demand Shocks, EAC, 1973-2001
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 Figure 1b. Supply Shocks, EAC, 1973-2001
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The larger the size of the shocks the more difficult it is to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate. This is particularly true of the supply shocks that may require more painful 
adjustments. The graphs indicate that the shocks are relatively equally distributed 
between negative and positive shocks. The demand shocks however were larger 
during the mid-eighties for all countries with the exception of Burundi. Demand 
shocks though seem to have declined after the later part of eighties for all countries. 
Generally the supply shocks experienced by the countries show more 
pronounced and more frequent peaks and troughs than the demand disturbances, and 
there are no indications of a tendency of these shocks to converge. The mid nineties 
were especially turbulent years for Rwanda, and to a lesser extend Burundi, due to 
civil war in those countries. Large negative shocks are evident during this period. 
Uganda experienced similar large negative shocks during the early eighties for the 
same reason. Kenya experienced large positive shocks in the mid seventies due to a 
boom in coffee prices – a primary export commodity for that country.  
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 Correlations of Supply and Demand Shocks across EA Countries 
 Tables 4 and 5 report the correlation coefficients of the identified supply and 
demand shocks among the East African countries. We also compare these shocks with 
those of selected EU countries and the U.S. The more symmetric the shocks as 
indicated by positive correlations, the more feasible it becomes for a group of 
countries to establish a monetary union. We look first at the supply shocks in Table 4 
as these are more critical since they are more likely to be invariant to demand 
management policies (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994). Generally the 
contemporaneous EA supply shocks are asymmetric and, if positive, the correlations 
are small which reflects the differences in the core export commodities as discussed in 
Section 2. Only the supply shocks for Kenya and Burundi are positive and 
significantly correlated. The correlations of lagged shocks are only slightly better. 
Specifically, Tanzania’s lagged shocks show more symmetry with EA shocks. The 
supply shocks experienced by Kenya and Burundi are positively and significantly 
correlated with those of Tanzania lagged one period, suggesting that supply shocks in 
Tanzania are transmitted to these countries. Supply shocks are also correlated with a 
lag between Burundi and Rwanda.  
The demand shocks for the EA countries in Table 5 are also generally 
asymmetric. The contemporaneous demand shocks experienced by Rwanda and 
Burundi are positively and significantly correlated to the shocks faced by Uganda and 
Tanzania. Though insignificant, the contemporaneous demand shocks faced by Kenya 
are positively correlated with those of other EA countries, except with Burundi. But 
this correlation is also positive when lagged. We attribute this to the fact that Kenya 
relies substantially on these markets. The other correlations are asymmetric. 
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 Table 4. Correlations of Supply Shocks, 1973 to 2001 
 Bur Ken Rwa Tan Uga U.K. U.S. Fra Ger Ita Euro 
Burundi 1.00           
Kenya ***0.54 1.00          
Rwandi 0.15 0.01 1.00         
Tanzania -0.12 -0.29 0.23 1.00        
Uganda -0.18 -0.01 -0.17 -0.31 1.00       
U.K. 0.11 -0.08 0.18 -0.16 0.07 1.00      
U.S. -0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.28 1.00     
France *0.35 0.12 0.05 0.13 -0.10 **0.38 **0.39 1.00    
Germany 0.03 -0.06 -0.28 -0.09 -0.01 0.22 0.12 0.24 1.00   
Italy *0.32 0.14 -0.13 0.11 -0.14 0.14 -0.07 ***0.69 0.29 1.00  
Euro-bloc 0.21 0.00 -0.17 -0.08 -0.13 **0.32 0.21 **0.38 ***0.91 **0.40 1.00 
L.burundi 0.11 -0.08 **0.39 -0.09 -0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.07 -0.35 -0.07 -0.17 
L.kenya -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 0.20 -0.04 0.01 -0.24 0.17 -0.12 
L.rwanda 0.25 -0.16 0.03 -0.02 -0.15 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.10 -0.05 0.18 
L.tanzania **0.44 *0.37 0.18 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.30 
L.uganda -0.28 -0.41 -0.18 -0.08 0.00 0.20 -0.19 0.03 0.16 -0.09 -0.04 
L.U.K. -0.02 0.00 0.29 -0.14 -0.07 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.29 0.02 
L.U.S. 0.18 *0.35 0.17 -0.36 0.14 0.27 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.06 
L.france 0.07 0.19 **0.47 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.40 -0.07 -0.35 0.02 -0.27 
L.germany 0.15 0.27 0.05 -0.13 -0.08 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.01 
L.italy 0.21 *0.31 **0.46 0.09 -0.27 -0.28 -0.53 -0.24 -0.48 -0.07 -0.45 
L.Euro 0.30 *0.35 0.17 -0.20 -0.10 -0.04 -0.32 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.01 
Notes: *** (**, *) Indicates statistical significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. The prefix L. 
indicates supply shocks lagged one period. Contemporaneous supply shocks are not 
prefixed. Positive (negative) values indicate symmetry (asymmetry). 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations of Demand Shocks, 1973 to 2001 
 Bur Ken Rwa Tan Uga U.K. U.S. Fra Ger Ita Euro 
Burundi 1.00           
Kenya -0.24 1.00          
Rwanda *0.31 0.00 1.00         
Tanzania -0.44 0.16 -0.07 1.00        
Uganda -0.31 0.16 -0.41 **0.40 1.00       
U.K. -0.07 -0.03 -0.46 0.08 0.23 1.00      
U.S. 0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.17 0.03 ***0.50 1.00     
France 0.09 0.22 -0.15 -0.28 -0.26 -0.04 -0.09 1.00    
Germany -0.12 -0.11 0.10 -0.12 -0.35 -0.36 -0.46 **0.40 1.00   
Italy -0.19 -0.03 0.18 -0.06 -0.47 -0.22 -0.39 0.13 *0.33 1.00  
Euro-bloc -0.03 -0.25 0.14 -0.38 -0.41 -0.18 -0.14 ***0.49 ***0.67 0.22 1.00 
Lburundi 0.04 0.04 0.11 -0.25 -0.23 0.07 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.15 
Lkenya 0.02 -0.14 -0.38 -0.02 0.13 0.26 -0.04 0.13 0.11 0.03 -0.12 
Lrwanda 0.11 0.18 -0.04 -0.34 0.07 -0.17 -0.01 0.07 0.27 0.07 0.07 
LTanzania -0.38 0.15 -0.32 0.04 **0.38 0.24 0.02 0.13 -0.19 -0.10 0.05 
Luganda -0.06 0.15 -0.38 -0.01 0.08 **0.45 0.16 0.29 -0.36 -0.24 0.00 
LU.K. 0.05 -0.15 *0.32 0.04 -0.15 -0.10 0.13 0.03 0.05 -0.05 *0.33 
LU.S. *0.34 -0.12 *0.34 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 -0.17 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.26 
Lfrance 0.21 -0.31 0.07 -0.09 -0.13 0.26 0.15 0.11 -0.02 0.13 -0.13 
Lgermany -0.04 -0.08 0.06 0.02 0.14 -0.31 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.22 
Litaly -0.08 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.07 -0.39 -0.12 0.26 *0.33 0.07 0.05 
LEuro 0.00 -0.27 0.16 0.03 -0.06 -0.31 -0.16 -0.10 0.19 0.13 0.05 
Notes: *** (**, *) Indicates statistical significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. The prefix L. 
indicates demand shocks lagged one period. Contemporaneous demand shocks are not 
prefixed. Positive (negative) values indicate symmetry (asymmetry). 
 
 
Overall, most of the correlation values are either low or asymmetric and do not 
show much support for a monetary union in contrast to the findings of Mkenda 
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 (2001). The correlations for EA countries seem much more asymmetric compared to 
the correlations for CFA zone obtained by Fielding and Shields (2001) and more 
comparable to those found for the SADC by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004). Using 
pre-war data (up to 1993) for Rwanda and Burundi does not improve the symmetry of 
supply shocks with other EA countries, while the demand shock correlations show 
more positive, though still mostly non-significant, values for Burundi only. Analyses 
of shocks during the sub-periods 1970 to 1985 and 1986 to 2001 do not show any 
indication of increased symmetry in the correlation coefficients between the two 
periods. Though some of the correlations obtained for the two periods are positive, 
none of them are significant. The values obtained for the latter period do not show any 
distinct improvement over the earlier period. This sub-periods analysis excludes 
Rwanda and Burundi. 
Finally, Tables 4 and 5 do not suggest a clear choice of an external anchor 
currency between the U.S. dollar and the Euro. Although the EU is the largest 
destination of EA exports, this does not show up much in the correlation of 
contemporaneous shocks. Contemporaneous supply and demand shocks for EA are 
mostly asymmetric with those of the hard currencies considered. However, the lagged 
U.S. and Euro-bloc supply shocks show more positive correlations with the shocks to 
Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda. This seems to indicate that shocks to these countries 
get transmitted to EA with a lag. Lagged U.K. shocks however still show asymmetry 
with the EA supply shocks. Overall, although very tentative, the evidence from the 
supply shocks correlations seems to be marginally in favor of the Euro. 
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Impulse Response 
 In addition to isolating the underlying disturbances, it is beneficial to compare 
the response of the economies to the shocks in terms of the magnitude and speed of 
adjustment. This can be done by looking at the impulse response functions. The larger 
the size of the shock, the more disruptive its effects will be on the economy. 
Similarly, the slower is the adjustment after disturbances, the larger will be the cost of 
maintaining a single currency. 
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of output and the price level to 
a positive one unit demand and supply shock for EA. The impulse response functions 
for prices in Figure 2(a) indicate that the over-identifying restriction is satisfied for all 
countries—except Tanzania. The accumulated effect of supply shocks on prices is 
negative for all countries except for Tanzania which exhibits a small but positive 
effect. As shown in Figure 2(b) an expansionary supply shock induces positive long-
run output effects for all the countries, while demand shocks produce a gradual 
increase in prices over time as predicted by the AD-AS model (Figure 2c). The 
response functions for the EA countries seem not to differ much. The bulk of the 
adjustment of output to a supply shock occurs within the first three to four years for 
all the countries. Though this seems to be slightly faster time of adjustment than 
found for the EEC core countries by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), the 
accumulated long-run effect for EA is larger, around 0.03 to 0.08, compared to around 
0.025 for EEC.  
The adjustment of prices to supply shocks is also within the first three years 
and of a similar absolute magnitude (less than 0.1) for four countries but much larger 
(exceeding 0.6) for Uganda. These long-run effects are however more similar for the 
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 EA countries relative to those found for the CFA zone. The same is true of 
adjustments of prices to demand shocks. Overall, Figure 2(c) suggests that the speeds 
of adjustment, as well as the long-run effect, are similar across countries with the 
exception of Uganda. From these results it would seem that all the countries (except 
for Uganda) have similar magnitude and speed of adjustment to the shocks, 
tentatively pointing to a possibility of sustaining a monetary union.   
 
Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions 
Figure 2a. Impulse response functions for the price level to a positive 
supply shock 
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Figure 2b. Impulse response functions of the output level 
to a positive supply shock.
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 Figure 2c. Impulse response functions of the price level to a postive 
demand shock
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Variance Decomposition 
The forecast error variance shows the contribution of each shock to the 
movements in the two variables of the vector Xt ≡ . This gives an indication of 
which shocks are the more predominant accounting for the variability in vector X
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ
t
t
p
y
t.  
This is important because differences in the cause of variability in the countries could 
be indicative of underlying differences in transmission mechanism and policy 
strategies of the EA countries, which would be obstacles to regional monetary 
integration. 
 
Table 6. Variance Decomposition: Proportion of Real Output and Price 
Variability Due to Demand Shocks. 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Horizon 
(Years) 
Output Price  Output Price Output Price Output Price  Output  Price 
1 0.119 0.818 0.097 0.507 0.0245 0.879 0.072 0.979 0.022 0.890 
2 0.193 0.799 0.085 0.433 0.0458 0.464 0.079 0.980 0.023 0.790 
3 0.199 0.770 0.083 0.407 0.0661 0.472 0.094 0.980 0.038 0.695 
4 0.199 0.793 0.084 0.432 0.0658 0.463 0.120 0.975 0.047 0.765 
5 0.201 0.785 0.084 0.410 0.0669 0.475 0.135 0.982 0.055 0.767 
6 0.200 0.771 0.083 0.407 0.0665 0.473 0.130 0.980 0.057 0.586 
Notes: The values indicate the proportion of the forecast error variance in real output 
and price level due to demand shocks. The proportion due to supply shock is found by 
simply subtracting from one.  
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 Table 6 shows the proportion of variability of the log of real output due to 
demand shocks at one to six year time horizon. The proportion due to supply shocks is 
found by subtracting from unity. The supply shocks account for most of the variability 
of real output in all the East African countries.  The supply shocks account for over 
80% of all the variability at the six-year horizon. This corresponds to results obtained 
for East Asia (Zhang, Sato, and McAleer 2004) for the sample period prior to the 
crises, and is more uniform than those indicated for the European Union by 
Ballabriga, Sebastian, and Valles (1999). In contrast, variance decomposition of the 
price level indicates that demand shocks account for different proportions of the price 
level variability across the economies. Demand shocks contribute a much higher 
proportion of the variation in the price level relative to its contribution to the 
variability of real output. However the proportions differ markedly among the EA 
countries, ranging from over ninety percent in Tanzania to around forty in Kenya. 
Thus, although there are indications that structural supply shocks contribute to output 
changes in the East African countries in the same way, the contribution to changes in 
the price level is quite variable.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper uses a two variable VAR model to identify supply and demand 
shocks for East African countries in order to determine whether these countries are 
good candidates for a monetary union. The correlation results indicate that 
contemporaneous shocks among the EA countries are mostly asymmetric. Only the 
contemporaneous supply shocks for Kenya and Burundi are positive and significantly 
correlated, while the lagged values are not much better. The correlations of demand 
shocks show only a weak symmetry related to trade patterns. The correlation results 
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 therefore do not show strong support for a currency union at the moment but indicate 
that more integration may improve the symmetry of shocks. The impulse response 
functions for the EA countries follow a similar pattern, with the exception of Uganda. 
The bulk of the adjustment of output to a supply shock occurs within the first three to 
four years and the long-run magnitudes are close. The adjustment of prices to supply 
shocks is also within the first three years. Although the magnitude of the response is 
much larger in Uganda and the adjustment takes relatively longer, overall these results 
show some support for monetary union among the EA countries. However, the 
variance decomposition shows mixed results. The proportions of variability of real 
output accounted for by supply shocks are similar for all the EA countries. Demand 
shocks, however, contribute markedly different proportions of the variation in price 
level. Evidence in favor of linking an EA currency to an external anchor is weak. 
However, the evidence from the lagged supply shock correlations seem to be in favor 
of the Euro as anchor currency over the U.S. dollar and Sterling pound.  
The effect of further trade integration as envisioned by the EAC treaty could 
result in more or less symmetry in national business cycles. As Krugman (1993) 
argues, it is possible that the economies become more specialized and their cycles less 
similar. If, however, intra-regional trade shocks predominate, business cycles may 
become more symmetric as evidenced by Frankel and Rose (1998). Thus countries 
that may appear to be poor candidates for inclusion in a monetary union may turn out 
to be suitable candidates after joining the union if the union spurs trade. De Grauwe 
(2003) supports this second view suggesting that though concentration may occur, 
deeper integration reduces the importance of national borders increasing the 
likelihood that clusters of economic activity will transgress national borders. Which 
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 effect would actually dominate in the case of EA is an open question, suggesting the 
need for a gradual approach to monetary union. 
It is worth noting that the process of integration is going on, significant being 
the signing of the customs union treaty earlier in 2004, and the political will, a factor 
that has been stressed by Feldstein (1997) as the major motivation for the European 
monetary union, seems to be present to carry this through.  
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 Essay Two: Eastern and Southern Africa Monetary Integration: A Structural 
Vector Autoregression Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
The map of Africa is layered with a complex network of regional 
organizations. Many countries belong to a multiplicity of customs unions, 
development associations or other multi-country institutions that have various 
objectives and envision various degrees of integration.11 Some countries also use a 
common currency. For example, the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(UEMOA) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
use the CFA franc, previously pegged to the French franc and now to the euro. In the 
Southern Africa, the Common Monetary Area (CMA)12 uses the South African Rand. 
In recent years, with the launching of the euro, a number of regional integration  
groupings in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) have started to seriously consider 
monetary union, a few of them even setting tentative timetables for the process. For 
example, the revived East African Community (EAC)13 is targeting monetary union 
and ultimately a Federation. In 2004 they concluded a customs union treaty, and in the 
same year the committee on fast tracking the East African federation submitted its 
recommendations which propose a currency union by year 2009 and a Federation by 
2013.14 These recommendations are now to be debated by member countries. 
                                                 
11 Masson and Pattillo (2005) survey the existing proposed monetary integration initiatives 
and attempts to forecast the likely trends in the future exchange rate arrangements.   
12 The CMA is a monetary arrangement that uses the South African Rand as a common 
currency though each member country (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia) issues its own currency at 
par with the Rand. Botswana opted out in 1976, but remains linked to the Rand through a currency 
basket where the Rand weighs 60-70 %. 
13 The EAC consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania used a common currency until 1966 
when the East African Currency Board collapsed. Each country then introduced its own currency in 
1967. The old EAC finally collapsed in 1977, and was revived in 1999. 
14 See http://www.eac.int/fasttrack/news_2004_12_speech-wako.htm, Internet; accessed 
December, 2005.  
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 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has monetary union 
in the cards too, with a Central Bank Governors meeting in February 200515 
proposing 2016 for a SADC common currency. The Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA)16 also has a monetary union objective with its own time 
table to achieve this. Indeed, these proposed monetary zones are fostered as building 
blocks for an eventual African Monetary Union, an ideal of the African Union 
(Masson and Pattillo 2005). However, the effect of overlapping membership is 
viewed by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA 2004) as a stumbling block to 
integration due to confusion arising from differences in rules of origin, wasteful 
duplication of effort and counterproductive competition among countries and 
institutions.  
The goal of this paper is inform these deliberations by sorting out what 
groupings of countries appear to be good candidates for monetary unions. We focus 
on ESA since a number of countries in West Africa are already in similar monetary 
arrangements and have been studied by the previous literature. Particularly, Fielding 
and Shields (2001) apply the methodology used in this paper to the two CFA 
monetary unions (UEMOA and CEMAC). Using a model of government financing 
needs, Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo (2005) considers the possibility of extending the 
UEMOA to include countries in the proposed West Africa Monetary Zone. Benassy-
Quere and Coupet (2005) address the same question using cluster analysis. However, 
the proposed monetary unions in Eastern and Southern Africa have not received much 
research attention despite the apparent policy drive in that direction. Furthermore, 
there has been no research on the possibility of forming currency union(s) linked to 
                                                 
15 See Business Report, March 1, 2005 at http://www.busrep.co.za; accessed December 2005. 
The SADC currently has 13 members.  
16 The 20 member COMESA has the objective of establishing a common market and monetary 
union by 2025. The newest member, Libya, joined in June 2005 and is not included in the analysis. 
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 some hard currency, e.g., the euro, the dollar, or the British pound. We examine these 
options.  
The methodology used here follows Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) who 
were among the first to identify the underlying structural shocks using the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) technique developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Since 
then, a large literature has applied this methodology or a related approach to different 
compositions of country groups in Europe. More recently, Zhang, Sato, and McAleer 
(2004) and Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) among others, have used the same 
approach to investigate the situation in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia 
respectively. Application of this methodology to Africa has been limited to Fielding 
and Shields (2004) who identify and compare economic shocks to different members 
of the two CFA monetary unions in West Africa. They conclude that the pattern of 
output shocks suggests a need to redraw the internal boundaries of the Franc zone.  
Alternative methodologies applied to Eastern and Southern Africa provide 
mixed results. A study by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) using a GARCH model 
investigates which countries of SADC are suited to enter a South Africa Monetary 
Union. Their results indicate low degrees of symmetry of the real exchange rate 
shocks across most of these countries, suggesting that a monetary union would amass 
high costs relative to benefits. Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) regresses real growth on its 
first two lags to decompose shocks. Their results indicate that asymmetry of shocks 
prevails while the few significant correlations of shocks they find do not involve 
contiguous states. Masson and Pattillo (2005) raise serious doubts about a full African 
monetary union due to economic disparities and poor linkages, but view the selective 
expansion of existing monetary unions as a more promising strategy. Grandes (2003) 
concludes that the CMA and Botswana form an optimal currency area using a 
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 Generalized Purchasing Power Parity model. Mkenda (2001) employs the same model 
to analyze the suitability of the EAC for a monetary union. The study found that the 
real exchange rates between the EAC countries are cointegrated during the period 
from 1980 to 1998, suggesting that the EAC is an optimum currency area. The 
limitation of this approach is that it does not distinguish disturbances from responses 
since movements in macroeconomic variables reflect the combined effects of shocks 
and responses (Angeloni and Dedola 1999). The identification scheme due to 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) used here makes this distinction. 
 
The Case for an Optimum Currency Area: An Initial Assessment. 
Countries with a similar economic structure can be expected to have similar 
business cycles and therefore might be suitable for a monetary union. However, this 
does not appear to be the case for the countries we study in this paper. In particular, 
except for South Africa, all countries have one or two products forming a high 
proportion of their total output and exports (Table 7). Furthermore, different countries 
specialize in different primary or semi-processed products. Only a few countries 
specialize in similar products e.g., coffee and fish for the East African countries and 
oil for Egypt and Sudan. On those grounds, it is unlikely that the shocks experienced 
by various countries would be symmetric. Table 7 indicates that the ESA countries 
trade mostly with developed countries, especially Western Europe, while intra-region 
trade is low. This limits the potential benefits from reduced currency transaction costs 
and reduced exchange rate uncertainty. However, a single currency linked to the euro 
may lead to substantial gains for these countries.17 A few countries show relatively 
                                                 
17 Political interferences in monetary affairs, which is widespread in Africa, are prime causes 
of harmful monetary uncertainty. Several authors such as Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) make an 
argument for monetary union on this ground, that a monetary union acting as an agent of monetary and 
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 large intra-ESA trade. South Africa, the biggest and most developed economy in the 
ESA, is an important market for the Southern cone countries such as Malawi, Zambia, 
and Mozambique. The East African region also shows higher trade links, with Kenya 
exporting a substantial portion of its products to its neighbors. 
 
Table 7. Trade Relations of ESA Countries as Percentage of Exports (Imports) of 
Goods, (2003) 
  US W-Europe Africa ESA Major traded commodities 
Exports 1.63 60.53 9.07 8.19 Coffee (76.8) Burundi 
Imports 2.12 32.16 44.03 40.86 Petroleum oils (23) 
Exports 11.77 73.19 0.95 0.69 Vanilla (74.9), cloves (11.6) Comoros 
Imports 0.56 41.62 22.56 21.62 Vehicles & parts (19.8) 
Exports 13.35 54.22 4.52 2.01 Petroleum (28.6) Egypt 
Imports 13.65 19.39 2.59 1.23 Cereals (6.8) 
Exports 5.07 31.85 18.46 2.43 Coffee (36.0), vegetables (21.6) Ethiopia 
Imports 17.03 20.59 2.51 1.99 Cereals (15.1) 
Exports 9.43 32.90 37.46 32.02 Petroleum oils (19.1), Tea (19.0) Kenya 
Imports 5.14 23.84 14.02 13.06 Petroleum (22.7) 
Exports 29.23 50.48 8.03 7.62 Clothing (27.5), Vanilla (24.7) Madagascar 
Imports 2.27 23.84 14.56 11.40 Petroleum (10) 
Exports 17.55 67.35 10.01 9.60 Clothing (51), Cane/beet sugar (16.3) Mauritius 
Imports 2.62 29.49 17.01 16.12 Petroleum (9.6) 
Exports 13.47 33.29 34.21 31.90 Tobacco (49.3), Cane(beet) sugar (23.1) Malawi 
Imports 2.97 12.64 69.55 65.60 Petroleum (11.5) 
Exports 0.80 52.81 21.71 16.59 Unwrought aluminum (69.6)   Mozambique 
Imports 3.87 14.48 27.50 26.76 Petroleum (9.4) 
Rwanda Exports 1.73 11.07 2.95 1.82 Coffee (27.8), Tea (23.8) 
 Imports 2.44 25.38 38.33 35.71 Petroleum (15.8) 
SACCAa Exports 2.97 93.32 2.58 1.75 Not available 
 Imports 16.02 45.27 0.45 0.63 Not available 
S. Africa Exports 12.38 40.90 14.46 7.34 Platinum (10.1), Cars/trucks (7.5) 
 Imports 8.25 45.64 4.45 1.74 Petroleum (11.1) 
Seychelles Exports 0.81 95.56 0.47 0.43 Fish (83.1) 
 Imports 0.86 39.18 14.22 14.16 Fishing vessels & parts (5) 
Sudan Exports 0.26 12.79 4.39 3.72 Crude oil (80) 
 Imports 0.64 23.90 7.98 7.47 Vehicles & parts (8.3) 
Tanzania Exports 2.51 31.47 19.72 15.90 Gold (36.1), Fish (9.4) 
 Imports 3.22 22.61 23.80 23.34 Petroleum (18.6) 
Uganda Exports 2.39 40.41 36.07 30.65 Coffee (22.4), Fish (14.2) 
 Imports 5.70 19.33 35.72 35.53 Petroleum (13.6) 
Zambia Exports 0.65 43.50 45.62 39.61 Tobacco (32.9), Nickel (17.4) 
 Imports 2.10 15.05 67.66 54.06 Vehicles & parts (9.3) 
Note: aSACU countries excluding South Africa. 
Sources: IMFs DOTS (2004) and United Nations International Trade Centre 
http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm; accessed December 2005. 
 
Estimates by Ackello-Ogutu and Echessa (1998) also show that unrecorded trade in 
this sub-region is high; in some cases over 50% of recorded trade. The stronger trade 
                                                                                                                                            
possibly fiscal restraint could produce large gains for its members from increased macroeconomic 
stability. 
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 links may contribute to greater similarity of economic fluctuations and to potentially 
greater benefits of a monetary union among these groups of countries.  
In the traditional optimum currency area (OCA) theory introduced by Mundell 
(1961), the cost of a monetary union is the country’s inability to use monetary policy 
to react to country-specific shocks. However, this cost is lower if the member 
economies can adjust to shocks via labor mobility between countries and/or if wages 
are flexible. Labor mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa is considered high traditionally 
(Benassy-Quere and Coupet 2005; Masson and Pattillo 2005), though data on 
international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa remain fragmentary and incomplete. 
Adepoju (2001) outlines major migration configurations in the region. The main 
recipient countries in the recent past have been South Africa and Botswana, whereas 
the sending countries include Kenya and Uganda. Mobility is however undermined by 
security concerns and high unemployment (ECA 2004), resulting in reluctance to 
implement regional initiatives on free movements of persons. 
The dual nature of the labor markets in Sub-Sahara Africa makes it hard to 
generalize on wage flexibility. Most countries have minimum wage legislations in the 
formal sector. However, the informal sector, considered to be highly flexible, is 
dominant in the region. Most countries have a large and growing labor force that puts 
downward pressure on real wages. There are however important differences among 
countries. For example, Ethiopia has high unemployment, and appears to have 
downward inflexibility of wages. Some countries also show a union impact on wages 
e.g., South Africa (Schultz and Mwabu 1997) and Kenya (IMF 2003). However, Teal 
(2000) finds that though there is a union impact, unemployment in South Africa has 
an impact on wages identical to that found in OECD countries.  
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 Finally we should point out that a scheme for compensatory fiscal transfer 
across differentially affected regions is not a viable option in ESA. Most of the 
countries are aid-dependent. Only four of them: South Africa and the three tiny 
economies of Botswana, Mauritius, and Seychelles are classified as middle income 
countries.  
 
Methodology 
The aim is to identify and compare macroeconomic shocks to different Eastern 
and Southern African countries. We focus on shocks to aggregate output growth and 
inflation. To recover the underlying shocks we use the VAR identification scheme 
due to Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). The 
identification scheme is based on the Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply (AD-AS) 
framework. In this framework, the short-run aggregate supply curve is upward 
slopping due to sticky wages. A higher price level lowers the real wage, inducing 
higher employment and raising output. However, in the long-run real wages adjust to 
price changes so that the long-run aggregate supply curve is vertical at the full 
employment level of output. The aggregate demand curve is downward sloping both 
in the short and the long-run to reflect the assumption that lower prices boost demand. 
Supply shocks such as those originating from changes in technology, have long-run 
permanent effects on the full employment level of output. A positive supply shock 
reduces price and increases output. Conversely, the effect of a positive shock to 
aggregate demand is a short-term increase in output that gradually returns to its initial 
level as the real wage adjusts. The long-term effect is only a permanent increase in 
prices. Thus, both supply and demand shocks have long-run effects on the level of 
prices though in opposite directions. 
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Identification of Supply and Demand Shocks 
We assume that fluctuations in real output {yt} and the price level {pt} are the 
result of two underlying types of shocks: supply and demand shocks. Assume also 
that the variables are unit root, so that the vector Xt ≡ is stationary. The joint 
process of two variables (changes in GDP and the price level) can be represented by 
an infinite moving average representation of a vector of the two variables and an 
equal number of structural shocks. Let ε
⎥⎦
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⎡
Δ
Δ
t
t
p
y
t be the vector of demand and supply shocks, 
(εdt, εst ).  Formally, the bivariate moving average of Xt can be represented as: 
Xt ≡    = ∑                                 (2.1) ∑∞
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where Δyt and Δpt represent changes in the log of output and prices, L is the lag 
operator, Ai represents the impulse response function of the shocks to the elements of 
the vector Xt, and  εdt, εst are independent white noise supply and demand shocks 
normalized so that Var(εt)=I. To decompose the shocks, the AD-AS framework 
assumes that demand shocks do not have any effect on output in the long-run. Thus, 
the cumulative effect of demand shocks on the change of the log of output (Δyt) must 
be zero: 
∑∞
=
=
0i
i11 0a                                                                                                 (2.2) 
The supply side and demand side shocks can be recovered from estimating a finite 
order VAR. The optimal lag length (p) is chosen such that its residuals approximate 
white noise. Each element of vector Xt is regressed on lagged values of all the 
elements of Xt: 
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 tptpttt eXXXKX +Φ++Φ+Φ+= −−− ...2211 ,                                      (2.3) 
where K denotes a vector of constants, Φis are the coefficients from the estimating 
equation and et is a vector of the residuals . The vector e⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
pt
yt
e
e
t is a composite of 
demand and supply shocks. If the process is covariance stationary we can take 
expectations of (3) to calculate the mean μ of the process: 
μμμμ pK Φ++Φ+Φ+= ...21                                                              (2.4) 
Subtracting (2.4) from (2.3) gives (2.3) in terms of deviations from the mean: 
tptpttt eXXXX +−Φ++−Φ+−Φ=− −−− )(...)()( 2211 μμμμ             (2.5) 
The VAR(p) in (5) can be represented as a VAR(1) process. To do this, define: 
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Then (2.5) can be written as VAR(1): 
t1tt VF +ξ=ξ −                                                                                          (2.6) 
and recursive substitution of (6) implies that: 
                           (2.7) t
s
t
s
stststst FVFVFFVV ξξ +++++= +−−+−+++ 11221 .....
If the eigenvalues of F all lie inside the unit root circle, then Fs → 0 as s → ∞ and the 
VAR is covariance stationary ((Hamilton 1994). The first two rows of (2.7) then give 
the vector moving average (∞) representation of Xt : 
 Xt =  μ+ et + C1et-1 + C2et-2 + C3et-3 + C3et-3 + C4et-4.                              (2.8) 
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 where Cj =F11(j) and F11(j) denotes the upper left block of  Fj which is the matrix F 
raised to the jth power. Equations (2.1) and (2.8) yield the relationship between the 
estimated residuals (et) and the structural shocks (εt): 
et = A0εt                                                                                                  (2.9) 
Therefore we need to know the elements of A0 to calculate the underlying 
structural supply and demand shocks. The variance-covariance matrix of residuals 
( ) 00 )( AAee tttt ′′Ε=′Ε εε and the Cis are known from estimation. To recover the four 
elements of A0 in the two-by-two case we need four restrictions.18 Two are simple 
normalizations which define the variances of εdt, and εst (usually to one). Since εdt, and 
εst are deemed to be pure shocks, a third restriction applied is to assume that demand 
and supply shocks are orthogonal so that E(εdt εst) = 0 (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
1992). The term E ( tt )εε ′  then drops out as I2, and we have E ( )ttee ′  = Ω = 00 AA ′ .  The 
variance-covariance matrix of residuals Ω is a known symmetric matrix. From this we 
obtain the following three restrictions: 
2
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2
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22
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21 )0()0()( aaeVar pt +=                                                                 (2.10b) 
)0()0()0()0()()cov( 22122111 aaaaeeEee ptytptyt +==                           (2.10c) 
The final restriction is to impose the condition that demand shocks have no long term 
effects on output as in (2.2). In terms of the VAR this implies: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡∑∞
= **
*0
aa
aa
cc
cc
2221
1211
0i i22i21
i12i11                                                        (2.11) 
                                                 
18 Four equations to solve for four unknowns. 
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 These restrictions allow the matrix A0 to be uniquely defined and hence the demand 
and supply shocks to be identified. Two series of exogenous shocks are obtained and 
the correlations of these shocks computed for the East African countries. 
 
Data 
The main data source used in this study is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, and the IMFs International Financial Statistics. Annual data 
for 21 Eastern and Southern Africa countries are used. For most of these countries the 
data cover the sample period from 1971 to 2002. For Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda, 
the data are from 1970 to 2001, whereas for the Comoros, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
and Namibia the data are for the period 1980 to 2002.  Real GDP growth is used to 
measure changes in output, while changes in the implicit GDP deflator represent price 
changes. For each country we use the first difference of the natural logs of real GDP 
and the implicit GDP deflator for estimation. Although they are available, it is worth 
noting that the quality of reported data by some countries, particularly Uganda, 
Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi may have been affected by civil unrest —Uganda 
throughout most of the early eighties, Rwanda and Burundi in the early nineties and 
Sudan through most of the data period. The data for Zimbabwe proved unstable and 
this country is not included in the analysis. Data for several countries of interest 
within the region: Djibouti, Somalia, Angola, Congo D. R., and Eritrea are either not 
available or the series are too short to be used for any meaningful analysis. The data 
for EMU countries, the U.K., and the U.S. span the period 1970 to 2001. We consider 
a GDP-weighted aggregate of all EMU countries as well as a few core countries 
individually: Germany, France, and Italy. 
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 Empirical Results 
The time series properties of the variables were investigated using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and it was found that both variables are I(1). Therefore 
the first differences of the variables are used to ensure stationarity. Tests for stability 
show that the eigenvalues of (F) in (6) all lie inside the unit root circle (except for 
Zimbabwe, which is not included in the study). The VAR is thus covariance 
stationary. For estimation of the empirical two-variable VAR the number of lags is set 
to two in all cases since both the SBIC and AIC statistics indicate that all models have 
an optimal lag length of one or two. From the estimated VAR the underlying supply 
and demand shocks were recovered as described in Section 3. 
 
Correlations of Supply and Demand Shocks 
Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 report the correlation coefficients of the identified 
supply and demand shocks among the Eastern and Southern African countries with 
positive and statistically significant correlations highlighted. Positive correlations are 
considered symmetric and if negative they are considered asymmetric. The more 
symmetric the shocks, the more feasible it becomes for a group of countries to 
establish a monetary union. The tables contain a large number of correlations for all 
pairs of countries.  
We look first at the supply shocks. These are more critical since they are more 
likely to be invariant to demand management policies. The correlations of 
contemporaneous and lagged supply shocks in Tables 8 and 9 are generally small and 
asymmetry seems to prevail. There are a few positive and significant correlations. 
Even then, unlike in Bayoumi and Ostry (1997), a weak pattern is discernible. South 
Africa, the major economy in the southern tip, shows some significant correlation in 
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the supply shocks it faces with those faced by its neighboring states of Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Mozambique. South Africa is a significant market for these countries. 
We also find a few positive and significant pair-wise correlations among contiguous 
states in the Eastern and North Eastern region e.g., Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. This is probably due to the more similar pattern of 
output and higher intra-sub region trade. However, no specific country seems to be a 
natural anchor for this sub-region. Although there are a few significant cross 
correlations between the Northern and Southern economies, we cannot identify any 
form of consistency. 
The island economy of Seychelles shows significant correlations with the 
other insular countries of Madagascar and Comoros. It also seems to show more 
correlation with the Eastern African countries than with the Southern African ones, 
probably due to the patterns of output rather than trade. Tanzania seems to be the 
water-shed economy, showing significant supply shock correlation with countries in 
the Northern, the Southern regions and the Island economies. Coincidentally, 
Tanzania is also the only country that is a member of the EAC and SADC.  
ESA supply shocks do not show much symmetry with those of either Europe 
or the US. However, except for the Comoros, the other island economies have 
positive and significant correlations with EMU countries. Contemporaneous shocks 
faced by Seychelles and EMU countries and the U.S. are symmetric, while the 
contemporaneous shocks for Madagascar and Mauritius are symmetric with those of 
the EMU and the U.S. lagged one period. In the Eastern Africa sub-region Kenya, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Ethiopia show symmetry with EMU countries. The Southern 
African countries including South Africa do not show any synchronicity with either 
Europe or U.S. shocks.  
 Table 8. Correlations of Contemporaneous Supply Shocks 
 Bo Bu 
0
Co Eg Eth Ke Le Mad Mau Mal Moz Nam Rw S.A Sey Sud Swa Tan Ug Za 
Bo 0 1.                     
Bu -0.08 1.00                   
Co -0.41 -0.03 1.00                  
Eg 0.28 -0.30 0.31 1.00                 
Eth 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.21 1.00                
Ke -0.23 -0.07 -0.28 -0.04 -0.04 1.00               
Le 0.03 0.11 *0.39 0.19 0.19 -0.13 1.00              
Mad -0.19 -0.34 0.02 0.16 -0.22 *0.40 -0.24 1.00             
Mau -0.37 *0.42 0.08 -0.07 0.18 *0.39 0.31 *0.52 1.00            
Mal -0.14 -0.38 -0.29 0.11 0.08 0.29 0.06 0.00 -0.07 1.00           
Moz -0.23 0.05 0.04 -0.32 0.22 0.23 -0.04 0.17 *0.57 0.05 1.00          
Nam -0.07 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.05 -0.39 0.34 0.00 0.21 -0.46 -0.11 1.00         
Rw -0.10 0.19 -0.19 -0.11 0.20 *0.48 0.22 0.04 0.23 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 1.00        
S.A. 0.02 -0.32 0.10 0.22 0.25 -0.11 *0.37 -0.06 -0.15 0.12 *0.38 -0.19 0.05 1.00       
Sey -0.48 -0.16 0.33 -0.05 0.19 -0.12 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.27 0.07 0.32 0.13 0.05 1.00      
Sud 0.24 0.05 -0.23 -0.01 *0.34 -0.16 -0.13 -0.09 0.07 -0.05 0.21 0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 1.00     
Swa -0.06 -0.08 0.15 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.13 0.17 0.29 -0.04 0.32 0.16 -0.38 *0.47 -0.05 0.01 1.00    
Tan -0.27 -0.20 0.07 0.28 0.04 0.06 0.03 *0.40 *0.51 0.17 *0.51 -0.11 -0.12 0.30 *0.36 -0.03 *0.32 1.00   
Ug 0.11 *0.56 -0.27 -0.04 0.20 -0.20 0.03 -0.21 -0.03 -0.26 -0.09 0.10 0.13 -0.21 -0.23 0.25 -0.04 -0.30 1.00  
Za 0.25 -0.27 -0.18 0.22 -0.36 -0.07 -0.28 0.11 -0.45 0.10 -0.51 0.15 -0.33 -0.21 -0.13 -0.20 -0.14 -0.23 -0.20 1.00 
Fra 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.03 -0.14 -0.02 *0.36 *0.44 0.21 *0.36 0.01 -0.16 0.13 -0.10 -0.03 
Ger -0.09 0.12 -0.13 -0.14 *0.32 -0.16 -0.04 -0.18 -0.31 0.24 -0.14 0.13 0.00 -0.06 *0.47 0.04 -0.31 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 
Ita -0.07 -0.09 -0.31 0.18 *0.34 -0.01 0.26 -0.03 -0.22 0.06 -0.05 0.30 0.29 *0.47 0.22 0.11 -0.15 0.11 -0.14 -0.11 
EU -0.11 0.16 -0.16 -0.11 0.23 -0.06 0.10 -0.19 -0.07 0.24 -0.13 0.20 0.17 -0.02 *0.54 0.00 -0.33 -0.06 -0.13 0.00 
U.K. -0.11 *0.39 -0.05 -0.37 0.08 0.16 0.23 -0.16 0.32 -0.17 -0.12 0.06 *0.54 -0.14 0.14 -0.19 -0.41 -0.16 0.07 -0.21 
U.S. 0.02 0.18 -0.13 0.23 0.23 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.19 0.01 -0.17 0.33 *0.37 -0.12 *0.36 -0.10 -0.21 0.12 0.15 0.09 
Note: *Indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level or higher.  
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Table 9. Correlations of Contemporaneous Supply Shocks with Supply Shocks Lagged One Period 
 Bo Bu Co Eg Eth Ke Le Mad Mau Mal Moz Nam Rw S. A Sey Sud Swa Tan Ug Zam 
LBo 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.11 -0.23 -0.27 -0.01 -0.25 -0.49 *0.34 0.01 -0.05 -0.1 -0.5 -0.11 -0.24 0.05 
LBu 0.01 0.03 0.21 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.1 -0.03 -0.13 0.25 0.01 0 -0.16 0.12 0.17 -0.2 0.16 0.1 
LCo -0.02 0.23 -0.1 0.02 0.18 0.09 -0.17 0.22 0.12 -0.04 0.37 0.01 -0.18 -0.11 0.25 0.06 0.25 -0.24 *0.53 -0.1 
LEg *0.43 0.1 -0.5 -0.03 *0.35 0.25 0.25 -0.21 -0.27 0.27 -0.2 -0.45 0.13 -0.06 -0.28 0.07 -0.28 -0.37 0.03 -0.1 
LEth *0.39 -0.22 0.17 0.16 -0.01 0 0.02 0.09 0 -0.08 *0.37 0.15 -0.25 -0.1 -0.4 0.06 -0.15 -0.21 -0.1 *0.4 
LKe 0.16 -0.12 -0.1 -0.07 -0.16 -0.12 *0.41 -0.06 0.14 -0.04 0.07 0.23 0 *0.31 0.08 -0.14 0.16 0.15 -0.16 -0.1 
LLe -0.05 -0.02 0.2 -0.15 0.05 0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.27 -0.01 0.04 0.16 -0.11 -0.22 0.14 -0.12 0.12 -0.36 -0.21 -0.1 
LMad 0.03 0.05 -0.4 -0.26 0.12 -0.07 0.18 -0.03 0.19 -0.06 *0.48 -0.19 0.09 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.12 *0.41 0.12 -0.5 
LMau *0.43 0.31 0.03 -0.23 0.33 -0.18 0.27 -0.36 0 -0.24 0.03 0.23 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.3 0.27 -0.31 *0.49 -0.3 
LMal -0.01 -0.17 *0.4 0.22 0.09 -0.14 0.18 0.27 0.08 0.04 -0.28 *0.42 -0.14 -0.09 0.32 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.38 0.17 
LMoz *0.39 0.08 -0.1 0.14 -0.05 -0.26 -0.03 -0.15 -0.3 -0.44 -0.23 *0.47 0.11 -0.08 0.03 0.11 0.05 -0.13 *0.47 0.09 
LNam -0.13 0.12 0 -0.06 *0.55 0.26 0.18 0.2 0.37 -0.02 0.04 -0.15 *0.4 -0.04 -0.08 0.28 *0.46 -0.06 0.33 -0.3 
LRw 0.05 -0.14 0.25 -0.36 -0.55 0.22 -0.04 0.2 0.13 -0.17 0.2 -0.32 -0.02 -0.04 -0.3 -0.26 0.11 -0.16 -0.18 -0.1 
LS.A. 0.19 0.06 -0.3 0.16 -0.2 0.04 -0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.19 -0.08 0.19 -0.17 -0.24 -0.27 0 -0.06 -0.13 0.01 0.05 
LSey -0.03 -0.08 0.06 0.1 0.06 *0.31 -0.18 *0.6 *0.53 -0.16 0.18 0.17 0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.06 0.1 -0.04 0.1 0.04 
LSud 0.11 -0.03 *0.4 *0.43 0.18 -0.08 0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 -0.2 -0.1 -0.08 -0.17 -0.12 -0.11 *0.32 0.1 -0.1 
LSwa 0.07 *0.35 -0.3 0.27 *0.36 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.18 -0.14 0.14 0.21 -0.1 0.12 0.08 *0.46 0.13 0.15 0.3 -0.2 
LTan 0.12 0.11 -0.4 0.01 *0.36 0.29 0 0.04 0.22 -0.02 0.28 0.23 0.2 -0.11 -0.04 *0.39 -0.07 0 0.22 -0.4 
LUga 0.15 -0.10 0.04 -0.28 0.0 -0.27 -0.31 -0.01 -0.4 -0.05 -0.22 -0.15 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 0.18 -0.04 -0.08 0 0.13 
LZam -0.31 0.02 -0.1 -0.01 0.17 0.19 *0.35 -0.02 -0.02 *0.43 -0.19 -0.16 *0.37 0.29 0.23 -0.22 -0.08 0.12 -0.11 0 
LFra 0.08 -0.30 -0.55 -0.03 -0.31 *0.53 0.03 *0.46 0.24 0.25 -0.02 -0.41 0.19 -0.12 -0.23 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
LGer -0.15 -0.21 0.34 0.06 -0.14 0.00 0.24 *0.36 0.21 -0.18 -0.19 *0.53 0.09 -0.18 0.01 -0.03 -0.19 -0.13 -0.08 0.18 
Lita 0.08 -0.39 -0.18 0.09 -0.32 *0.31 0.08 0.26 *0.39 0.24 0.08 0.00 -0.23 -0.11 -0.34 0.09 0.21 0.08 -0.27 0.07 
LEU -0.09 -0.13 0.33 0.07 -0.25 0.11 0.30 *0.34 0.28 -0.17 -0.33 *0.47 0.14 -0.23 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.20 -0.10 0.14 
LU.K. -0.08 -0.21 -0.10 -0.23 -0.47 0.23 -0.19 0.27 *0.49 0.11 0.21 -0.01 0.26 -0.25 0.09 -0.21 -0.19 -0.14 -0.07 0.06 
LU.S. 0.09 0.15 -0.25 -0.22 -0.02 *0.51 -0.13 0.23 0.04 -0.02 -0.17 -0.34 *0.51 -0.23 -0.26 0.08 -0.32 -0.34 0.14 0.12 
Notes: *Indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level or higher. (L) Indicates supply shocks lagged one period. 
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Table 10. Correlations of Contemporaneous Demand Shocks 
 Bo Bu 
0
Com Eg Eth Ke Le Mad Mau Mal Moz Nam Rw S. A Sey Sud Swa Tan Ug Zam 
B  ot 01.                     
Bur 0.08 1.00                   
Com -0.23 -0.39 1.00                  
Eg 0.04 0.04 -0.09 1.00                 
Eth -0.11 -0.14 -0.25 -0.13 1.00                
Ke -0.10 0.07 -0.39 -0.09 0.03 1.00               
Les 0.00 0.04 -0.30 -0.10 0.23 -0.06 1.00              
Mad -0.04 -0.15 -0.06 0.06 0.02 *0.54 -0.17 1.00             
Mau *0.42 0.21 -0.10 -0.08 0.04 0.30 -0.25 0.19 1.00            
Mal -0.09 -0.21 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.08 0.27 -0.59 1.00           
Moz 0.24 -0.08 -0.17 *0.61 -0.10 0.12 *0.37 0.31 -0.06 0.05 1.00          
Nam *0.59 0.23 -0.04 -0.09 0.14 -0.26 0.29 -0.03 *0.37 0.03 0.04 1.00         
Rwa 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.02 -0.06 -0.60 0.14 -0.70 -0.37 -0.03 -0.20 0.07 1.00        
S. A 0.12 0.12 -0.25 *0.32 0.17 0.00 0.12 0.04 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.26 0.02 1.00       
Sey -0.13 0.42 0.02 0.28 -0.15 -0.02 -0.10 -0.37 -0.01 -0.10 0.21 0.20 *0.31 -0.04 1.00      
Sud 0.27 -0.14 -0.24 -0.03 0.20 0.03 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.23 0.27 0.31 -0.17 0.03 -0.11 1.00     
Swa *0.32 *0.34 -0.16 -0.26 -0.08 -0.13 0.10 -0.06 0.19 0.06 -0.28 *0.39 0.00 *0.36 -0.13 0.19 1.00    
Tan 0.10 0.09 -0.26 *0.52 -0.01 0.20 0.05 *0.36 0.29 -0.10 *0.76 -0.04 -0.31 -0.03 0.11 0.10 -0.33 1.00   
Uga 0.19 *0.41 -0.35 0.01 0.09 0.01 *0.37 0.00 -0.01 0.11 *0.38 0.29 -0.07 -0.11 0.27 0.05 0.03 *0.40 1.00  
Zam -0.20 0.09 -0.17 *0.38 0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 -0.09 -0.14 *0.32 0.20 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
Fran -0.07 -0.44 0.01 -0.30 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.12 -0.34 0.02 -0.19 -0.09 0.03 -0.19 -0.24 -0.10 -0.29 -0.28 -0.26 -0.38 
Ger -0.34 -0.16 -0.19 -0.18 0.14 0.22 -0.04 0.10 -0.29 0.04 -0.26 -0.64 -0.04 0.09 -0.62 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.35 -0.24 
Ita -0.24 -0.21 *0.49 -0.12 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.18 -0.12 0.18 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.20 -0.29 0.17 -0.08 -0.06 -0.47 -0.16 
EU -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.16 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.26 -0.03 -0.35 -0.25 0.22 0.16 -0.42 -0.13 0.17 -0.38 -0.41 -0.28 
U.K. *0.68 0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.29 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 *0.48 -0.17 0.19 *0.57 -0.07 -0.15 0.12 -0.11 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.00 
U.S. 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.01 -0.35 0.04 -0.27 -0.02 0.31 0.04 -0.15 0.28 0.01 -0.35 *0.38 -0.14 0.17 -0.17 0.03 0.07 
Note: *Indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level or higher.  
 
 
 37
38
 
 
 
Table 11. Correlations of Contemporaneous Demand Shocks with Demand Shocks Lagged One Period 
 Bot Bur Com Eg Eth Ke Le Mad Mau Mal Moz Nam Rw S. A Sey Sud Swa Tan Ug Zam 
LBot 0.10 *0.38 -0.40 *0.36 -0.22 0.22 -0.13 0.18 0.09 0.10 -0.10 0.20 -0.10 *0.41 0.18 -0.07 0.28 -0.03 -0.02 0.40 
LBur -0.02 -0.03 0.12 -0.05 -0.23 -0.22 0.11 -0.44 -0.16 -0.12 -0.32 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.07 0.06 0.25 -0.25 -0.09 0.30 
LCom 0.27 0.22 -0.32 -0.17 -0.03 0.07 -0.20 0.03 0.35 -0.16 0.02 0.06 -0.22 -0.22 -0.26 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.22 -0.41 
LEg *0.38 0.14 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.10 -0.05 -0.04 0.36 0.16 0.23 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.12 *0.42 *0.45 0.15 0.15 -0.26 
LEth -0.12 -0.53 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 *0.34 0.12 0.31 0.00 -0.04 0.07 -0.40 -0.26 -0.17 -0.37 -0.13 -0.45 0.12 -0.17 -0.02 
LKe -0.09 -0.10 0.14 0.10 0.17 -0.09 0.05 0.02 -0.49 *0.33 0.15 0.04 0.32 -0.24 0.10 0.02 -0.37 -0.01 0.04 -0.16 
LLes 0.03 -0.25 *0.44 0.06 -0.26 -0.05 -0.17 0.21 0.14 -0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.29 -0.39 -0.20 0.12 -0.11 0.14 -0.24 0.24 
LMad -0.02 -0.14 0.09 -0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.28 0.09 -0.42 *0.55 0.14 0.08 0.22 -0.11 -0.17 0.23 -0.06 -0.03 0.22 -0.44 
LMau 0.09 *0.48 -0.37 0.10 -0.10 0.35 0.25 *0.46 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.20 *0.44 -0.34 -0.26 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.11 
LMal -0.08 -0.32 -0.13 -0.16 0.24 -0.01 0.03 -0.18 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.32 0.23 0.12 -0.15 -0.06 0.04 -0.16 
LMoz *0.57 0.07 -0.07 -0.23 0.12 0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.17 -0.03 0.37 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 *0.45 *0.42 -0.27 -0.08 -0.24 
LNam 0.15 0.02 -0.18 0.05 -0.03 *0.43 -0.14 0.34 *0.48 -0.28 -0.25 0.06 -0.43 0.31 -0.36 -0.04 0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.17 
LRw 0.04 0.17 -0.08 -0.26 -0.27 0.03 -0.16 -0.29 0.41 -0.34 -0.35 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.09 0.04 0.20 -0.12 -0.25 0.16 
LS.A -0.20 -0.12 0.27 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.20 -0.05 0.21 -0.09 0.16 -0.14 0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.18 0.00 0.05 
LSey *0.33 0.00 0.02 -0.35 0.09 -0.05 -0.16 -0.21 *0.52 -0.17 -0.43 0.39 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 0.24 -0.26 -0.22 -0.19 
LSud -0.02 0.00 -0.31 0.18 *0.44 *0.43 0.00 0.04 0.23 -0.40 -0.02 -0.10 -0.09 0.16 0.25 -0.05 -0.15 0.06 -0.03 *0.39 
LSwa -0.44 0.10 -0.19 0.23 0.03 -0.15 0.16 -0.27 -0.04 -0.18 -0.26 -0.17 0.08 0.10 0.06 -0.15 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 *0.58 
LTan *0.52 0.16 -0.18 -0.12 0.08 0.13 *0.34 0.10 -0.03 0.22 0.23 0.37 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 *0.30 *0.44 0.04 *0.38 -0.21 
LUga *0.47 -0.22 -0.02 0.13 -0.09 -0.29 0.07 -0.12 0.09 0.00 -0.06 *0.57 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.13 
LZam -0.09 -0.15 0.31 0.31 0.25 -0.08 0.05 0.07 0.32 -0.07 0.26 0.03 -0.24 0.23 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.40 -0.01 0.07 
LFran 0.00 -0.12 *0.38 0.09 -0.23 -0.04 -0.21 0.08 -0.17 0.09 0.16 -0.23 0.17 -0.33 0.02 -0.11 -0.42 -0.09 -0.13 -0.27 
LGer -0.38 -0.13 0.19 0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.19 -0.63 0.12 0.31 -0.47 *0.31 -0.22 *0.31 -0.01 -0.33 0.02 0.14 0.03 
Lital -0.32 -0.01 -0.04 -0.21 0.06 *0.52 0.14 0.12 0.03 -0.13 0.14 -0.53 -0.20 -0.37 -0.06 0.07 -0.25 0.12 0.07 -0.35 
LEU -0.30 0.05 0.01 0.16 -0.17 -0.21 0.05 -0.33 -0.40 -0.13 0.29 -0.37 *0.42 -0.02 0.14 0.15 -0.19 0.03 -0.06 0.03 
LU.K. 0.10 0.20 -0.08 *0.33 -0.21 0.07 -0.55 *0.34 0.11 0.29 -0.12 0.18 -0.13 *0.33 0.03 -0.05 0.29 0.04 -0.15 -0.01 
LU.S. 0.06 0.22 -0.22 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.41 0.04 0.22 0.15 -0.25 0.28 0.08 0.21 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 
Notes: *Indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level or higher. (L) Indicates demand shocks lagged one period. 
 The correlations of demand shocks reported in Tables 10 and 11 seem to 
reinforce the overall view of asymmetry seen from Tables 8 and 9. A number of 
contiguous states in the Southern tip (Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland, South 
Africa, Swaziland and Zambia) and the Eastern and North Eastern (Kenya, Ethiopia 
and Sudan; Sudan, Egypt, and Tanzania; Tanzania and Uganda; Burundi and Uganda) 
economies show some significant correlations. The demand shocks for the island 
economies again seem to correlate more with the Eastern African countries than 
Southern Africa. The demand shocks faced by ESA are predominantly asymmetric to 
those faced by Europe or the US. The few positive and significant correlations are in 
countries that are geographically dispersed.  
Overall, the correlations found for the Eastern and Southern Africa seem more 
asymmetric compared to the correlations for the CFA zone obtained by Fielding and 
Shields (2001) and more comparable to the exchange rate disturbances found for the 
SADC by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004). They are much smaller and less symmetric 
than some of the results found for the European Community and the European 
accession countries found by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001).  
Based on these correlations and geographical proximity, we do not find any 
support for an ESA-wide monetary union but tentatively suggest a tripolar route to 
monetary integration. The first is a monetary union to encompass the southern cone 
consisting of the existing CMA, expanding northwards to include Botswana, 
Mozambique, and Zambia.19 The second is an East African monetary union with the 
nucleus as the proposed EAC monetary union. This could gradually expand to include 
Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. Though it might not seem to be the 
natural anchor for the region it might still be the right nucleus since the East African 
                                                 
19South Africa’s earlier reluctance to expand the CMA noted in Sparks (2002) seems to have 
slowly given way to support, thus making a SADC currency more feasible.  
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 Community is showing the necessary political will and has taken concrete steps 
towards a monetary union. A third monetary union could be based on the Indian 
Ocean Commission (IOC)20 for the Island economies. Of the ESA sub-regions this 
exhibits higher symmetry. It is also the sub-region that does not have a monetary 
union agenda at the moment.  
The correlations do not show much support for an ESA-wide link to the Euro, 
Sterling pound or U.S. dollar. Based on the correlations the IOC region could benefit 
from linking their currency to the Euro. The evidence for the EAC seems weak, while 
there is no evidence at all for the SADC currency region. 
 
Impulse Response 
In addition to isolating the underlying disturbances, it is beneficial to compare 
the response of the economies to the shocks in terms of magnitude and speed of 
adjustment. This can be done by looking at the impulse response functions. The larger 
the size of the shock, the more disruptive its effects will be on the economy. 
Similarly, the slower is the adjustment after disturbances, the larger will be the cost of 
maintaining a single currency.  
For briefness, instead of drawing an impulse response function for the impact 
of each shock on each variable for all countries, we focus on the asymptotic effect of 
each shock on each variable. Table 12 summarizes the total long-run impulse 
response to a unit positive supply and demand shock for each economy. The impulse 
responses of the output level to a supply shock for ESA are generally small, all being 
less than 13%, but nonetheless greater than those for the Euro-bloc, the U.K., and the 
U.S. (less than 2%). The speed of adjustment is relatively high, with most effects 
                                                 
20 Composed of Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, The Comoros and Réunion (a French 
colony and not included in study), the objective of IOC is economic and commercial cooperation 
especially on maritime resources. 
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 dissipating by the second year and all by the third year. Except for Burundi, Comoros 
and Zambia, the cumulated effect of a supply shock on output is positive as expected. 
However there is a wider cross-country variation in the impulse response of the price 
level to a demand shock. For most countries, the speed of adjustment is low. Like in 
the output response, the effect of most shocks dissipates by around the third year, with 
the total effect comparing well with those of Euro bloc, U.K. and U.S. For four 
countries: Uganda, Zambia, Sudan, and Mozambique the accumulated effect is 
relatively large (40% and over). For all countries except Burundi and Swaziland, 
demand shocks produce an increase in prices over time. Most of the impulse 
responses of the price level to a supply shock also dissipate by the second or third 
year and compare favorably with those for U.S. and U.K. Only Uganda has a slow 
speed of adjustment and a large long-run effect of 52%.  However for quite a number 
of countries the cumulative effect of a positive supply shock on the price level are 
non-negative though small.  
From these results it would seem that the impulse responses are generally 
small for most countries and dissipate quickly, by the second or third year. The 
overall cumulative effects seem smaller than those found by Fielding and Shields 
(2001) for the CFA zone. Countries that show a marked difference in size and speed 
of adjustment seem to be confined to those (Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique) 
that have experienced major civil strife. It would be expected that as these countries 
stabilize the shocks to the economies will reduce. These results tentatively point to a 
possibility of monetary unions for some of the Eastern and Southern African 
economies. On average we find larger effects for ESA than for U.S., U.K. or Euro-
bloc, though a few countries do compare well. 
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Table 13 shows the proportion of variability of the log of real output due to 
demand shocks at one to six year time horizon. The proportion due to supply shock is 
found by subtracting from unity (100%). The percentage variability of real output 
accounted for by supply shocks is widely variable, ranging from less than 30% to over 
90% at the six year period. These results show more variation than the results 
obtained for East Asia (Zhang, Sato, and McAleer 2004) or those presented for the 
European Union by Ballabriga, Sebastian, and Valles (1999). The variance 
decomposition of the price level indicates that demand shocks account for a high 
proportion (over 80%) of the price level variability across most economies. However, 
there are a few countries that show wide variations, with some countries less than 
10%. Thus, these indicate that structural supply and demand shocks do not contribute 
to output changes and price variations in the same way across the Eastern and 
Southern African countries.  
The forecast error variance shows the contribution of each shock to the 
movements in the two variables of the vector Xt ≡ . This gives an indication of 
which shocks are the more predominant accounting for the variability in vector Xt.  
This is important because differences in the cause of variability in the countries could 
be indicative of underlying differences in the transmission mechanism and the policy 
strategies of the Eastern and Southern African countries, which could be an obstacle 
to regional monetary integration.  
Variance Decomposition 
Table 12. Long-Run Size of Impulse Responses 
 Impulse Response of Output Level to a
 Positive Supply Shock  
1 2
Impulse Response of Price Level to 
a Positive Demand Shock 
5 1 2 3
Impulse Response of Price Level to
 a Positive Supply Shock 
5 1 2 3Tim  e 3 4 4 4 5
1 0 0 0
   
Botswana 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Burundi 0.02 0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06
Comoros 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
Egypt 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
Ethiopia 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.11 -0.1 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Kenya 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12
Lesotho 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Madagascar 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
Mauritius 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07
Malawi 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0 -0.05 -0.08 -0.1 -0.1
Mozambique 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08
Namibia 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
Rwanda 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0 0 -0.01 0 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15
S.  Africa 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Seychelles 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Sudan 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.4 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.17
Swaziland 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Tanzania 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.0
Uganda 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.26 0.35 0.41 0.45 -0.07 -0.15 -0.25 -0.34 -0.42
Zambia -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.15 0.28 0.39 0.47 0.53 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08
Euro-bloc 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
U.K. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07
U.S.  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
Note: Multiply by 100 to get % change in variable. 
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Table 13. Variance Decomposition: Proportion of Real Output and Price Variability Due to Demand Shocks 
 Variation in Output Due to Demand Shock
1 2 3 4 5
  Variation in Price Due to Demand Shock
1 2 3 4 5Horizon: y     
Botswana  70.69 68.72 70.35 70.92 72.97 70.8 67.45 70.66 69.59 63.18 73.95 68.66
Burundi  78.25 77.01 74.56 72.7 74.99 72.48 0.63 4.98 8.7 0.57 10.07 9.67
Comoros  74.41 79.31 63.73 61.28 65.5 59.72 8.94 15.58 15.56 8.9 17.25 16.42
Egypt  1.36 2.43 2.93 3.1 3.16 3.16 89.18 87.44 86.84 84.34 89.56 82.33
Ethiopia  15.43 16.92 18.3 18.58 18.74 18.71 49.22 48.93 48.49 48.84 48.55 48.52
Kenya  36.36 38.93 40.62 41.13 42.04 41.19 98.73 75.43 71.64 73.72 73.02 71.33
Lesotho  48.92 48.56 53.79 53.57 56.36 54.18 62 61.56 57.52 60.24 58.9 57.99
Madagascar  1.01 1.35 1.32 1.67 1.68 1.72 87.24 79.3 78.54 72.72 82.2 74.84
Mauritius  0.31 0.74 0.94 0.97 0.99 0.97 99.97 79.71 73.35 74.78 85.5 73.21
Malawi  3.81 3.87 4.01 3.95 4.01 3.94 99.9 81.61 76.39 77.92 76.62 74.8
Mozambique 1.8 2.19 3.78 4.12 4.78 4.92 94.37 92.86 91.33 92.53 94.85 86.74
Namibia  49.63 50.13 49.92 49.99 50.35 50.06 89.48 85.27 85.89 84.86 86.76 85.96
Rwanda  62.94 61.16 60.25 60.29 60.45 60.29 21.04 31.09 30.68 19.3 30.86 30.72
South Africa 7.15 8.93 11.26 14.33 16.75 15.79 97.2 97.65 97.88 97.19 105.1 98.01
Seychelles  3.53 7.97 7.61 7.54 7.68 7.73 38.89 36.45 45.35 29.02 52.84 49.53
Sudan  0 1.22 1.22 1.28 1.39 1.36 80.18 83.51 84.37 77.83 105.61 84.03
Swaziland  48.66 49.57 45.41 45.43 45.77 45.21 96.15 94.79 93.91 94.03 95.47 93.71
Tanzania  5.08 6.32 7.81 10.48 11.97 11.61 97.85 98.01 97.98 97.43 98.21 97.98
Uganda  2.18 2.34 3.81 4.68 5.46 5.73 88.99 78.97 69.52 76.5 76.68 58.61
Zambia  2.09 1.97 2.92 3.4 3.62 3.72 96.28 97.82 97.64 96.09 117.34 97.59
Notes: The values indicate the proportion of the forecast error variance in real output and price level due to demand shocks. 
The proportion due to supply shock is found by simply subtracting from one. 
 
 
 Discussion 
We use a two-variable VAR model to investigate the potential for forming 
monetary unions in Eastern and Southern Africa. The countries in the sample are 
members of regional economic organizations that either have a monetary union as an 
immediate objective or might consider it in the future. We decompose the economic 
shocks experienced by these economies into supply and demand disturbances and 
study their correlation for all pairs of countries. The results do not provide evidence in 
favor of a broad monetary union encompassing all countries in the region. 
Nonetheless, we find tentative supportive evidence for three groupings of countries: 
(1) in the southern tip of Africa expanding the Common Monetary Area; (2) the 
member countries of the East Africa Community potentially including several other 
neighboring economies;21 and (3) the island economies. We should reiterate that this 
supportive evidence is relatively weak. Considering the question of external anchor-
currency, we find some support for linking an island (IOC) currency to the euro, and 
weaker evidence for linking an EAC currency to the Euro. However we find no 
evidence to support linking a Southern Africa (SADC) currency to any of the hard 
currencies considered.  
Recent literature suggests endogeneity of OCA criteria in the sense that it 
might be easier to satisfy them after a monetary union is formed than before. Studies 
have shown positive and economically significant (33%-90%) trade effect of 
monetary union (Rose and Stanley 2005). Theoretically, the effect of increased 
integration is ambiguous. It may lead to more symmetry because of common demand 
shocks or intra-industry trade (Frankel and Rose 1998), or it may lead to more 
                                                 
21The fear of South Africa hegemony Sparks (2002) by neighboring states may favor the 
adoption of a new SADC currency rather than adopt the South Africa’s “Rand.” This seems to be the 
thinking in the recent pronouncements by the SADC central bank governors. The same is true; to a 
lesser extend, of the EAC. A new currency, probably a joint “Shilling” like in the old EACB may be 
preferable. 
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 concentration and less symmetry (Krugman 1993). De Grauwe (2003) suggests more 
synchronicity is the likely outcome, since more integration will reduce the importance 
of national boundaries and thus the relevant regions in which some activity is 
concentrated will likely transgress national borders. For ESA to benefit from deeper 
integration major underlying problems that hinder intra-regional trade, such as 
infrastructure, non-complimentary production structures Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) 
and economic management, and internal political tension (Longo and Sekkat 2004) 
need to be addressed.  
Many of the arguments for membership in regional integration agreements are 
political concerns such as bargaining power and security. A common view is that 
Africa is becoming increasingly marginalized by globalization (Adepoju 2001) and 
that governments see deeper integration as a way to enhance their bargaining power 
by achieving a common negotiating position. Deeper regional integration is also a 
way to promote peace, security and stability by forcing a stronger commitment on 
members to peace within the union. Many of the countries we study have been 
involved in a serious internal strife in the recent past e.g., South Africa, Rwanda, 
Mozambique, and the Sudan. National borders, a colonial legacy that often cut across 
ethnic communities, have been another source of conflict e.g., between Botswana and 
Namibia, Ethiopia and neighboring Somalia and Eritrea. Nonetheless, this legacy has 
not stopped the affected countries from joining (sometimes the same) economic 
groups and making plans for further integration.22 If achieved, stability may turn out 
to be the most important gain for the region. Monetary union is an important policy 
which creates opportunities in many economic and non-economic areas. Thus 
                                                 
22 The complex colonial legacy of the region does not seem to have influenced regional 
membership. The creation of the EMU bloc has also reduced these links to two main currencies, the 
Euro and Sterling pound. U.K.’s entry into EMU would thus eliminate any conflict of interest. 
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 politicians would be reluctant—even in the face of unfavorable economics—to be left 
out. 
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 Essay Three: Monetary Union and Central Bank Independence 
 
Introduction 
The decision to enter a monetary union can bring important economic benefits 
as well as costs for the member countries. Starting with Mundell (1961), the literature 
has identified the restricted ability of member countries to react to negative economic 
shocks as the main cost of monetary unions. In a monetary union, monetary and 
exchange rate policies are decided at the union level and may not always be in line 
with the current needs of each member country. This is particularly problematic if the 
member countries have dissimilar business cycles and if wage rigidity and restricted 
labor mobility hamper macroeconomic adjustment. On the benefits side, monetary 
unions eliminate exchange rate uncertainty and the currency conversions costs among 
the member states, which may spur international trade and investment. An important 
benefit that has dominated the recent literature is the credibility argument. Monetary 
unions create the potential for some countries to “import monetary credibility” from 
other member countries with reputation for prudent monetary policy, e.g., Germany in 
the Euro-zone (Herrendorf 1997). Time wise this is a more efficient way to improve 
credibility than earning it through the alternative time consuming way of building a 
track record (Blinder 2000). 
In this paper we show that a monetary union can enhance monetary stability 
for its member states even if none of them have a history of prudent monetary policy. 
This is important because a number of monetary unions have been proposed among 
groups of developing countries that lack a history of stable prices or simply have a 
short history of independent monetary policy.23 Some authors, for example Mundell 
                                                 
23 Examples are the proposed East African Community (EAC) monetary union and the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) currency union.  
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 (2002), have argued that monetary unions could provide a means for credible 
commitment to sound macroeconomic policies. For example, Guillaume and 
Stasavage (2000) provide evidence that African countries that participate in monetary 
unions tend to pursue more credible monetary policies. 
We develop a Barro and Gordon (1983) type model where the preferences of 
the central banks of a group of countries considering monetary union are state 
contingent and thus not known to policy makers a priori as in Demertzis and Hallett 
(2004). This could arise from lack of independence such that the central banks may be 
pressured to accommodate government objectives in terms of output Demertzis and 
Hallett (2003). In addition, political patronage for particular members of management 
may shift over time affecting their influence on policy. In the developing countries 
these fears are ever present. Given the weak checks on the government, the 
uncertainty about the preferences of policymakers is expected to be higher in these 
countries. In this context, we show that shifting the conduct of monetary policy from 
the national level to a union level in a multilateral union decreases the variability of 
union-level inflation and improves welfare as long as the central banks of the member 
countries experience different pressures to inflate at different times. In the model, the 
opportunistic objectives of one member’s policymakers are kept in check at the union 
level by other members with disparate objectives. 
Our theoretical analysis extends a growing literature on the monetary and 
fiscal policy interactions of member states in a monetary union. Debrun, Masson, and 
Pattillo (2005) analyze the implications of financing needs using a theoretical 
framework that includes fiscal policy. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) explore how 
monetary unification impacts the accumulation of public debt and show that under 
fiscal leadership it may discipline fiscal and monetary policy, while Dixit and 
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 Lambertini (2003) explore the interaction of a centralized monetary policy with 
decentralized fiscal policy. They show that when monetary and fiscal authorities in a 
monetary union agree on the ideal output and inflation levels, ideal outcomes emerge 
as the equilibrium without the need for monetary commitment. Our analysis of the 
effect of asymmetry of central bank preferences in a monetary union is new to the 
literature.  
As an application to the theory, we investigate the feasibility of monetary 
union in the East African Community. The three member countries: Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda, recently signed a customs union treaty and have officially declared their 
goal to form a currency union. Two neighboring countries, Rwanda and Burundi, 
have indicated an interest to join and are included in the analysis. None of the five 
countries has a long or particularly successful history of monetary policy. Thus, their 
experience fits neatly our theoretical model. We parameterize the model to provide a 
welfare analysis for this monetary union based on a tradeoff between the loss of 
independent monetary policy and the gain from checks on monetary policy provided 
by member states. In this sense, we also extend a small but growing literature on 
monetary unions in Africa, for example Masson and Pattillo (2005), Honohan and 
Lane (2000), Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) and Buigut and Valev (2005), among 
others.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the model 
and Section 3 assesses the effects on monetary union. In Section 4 we apply the model 
to estimate the expected welfare effects of the proposed East African currency union. 
Section 5 presents the results of the analysis and Section 6 concludes.  
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 The Model 
We assume a country economic area where countries differ by the size of 
their GDP, the random supply shocks affecting output and their preferences for output 
stimulation. Output y
n
i (all variables in logarithms) in country i  differs from its natural 
level by an amount determined by the difference between actual and expected 
inflation and an output shock:  
( ) , 1,....,ei i i i iy y b i nπ π ε= + − + =                                                                       (3.1) 
The unexpected inflation ( ) affects activity with  as the marginal 
output gain from unexpected inflation; 
e
ii ππ − 0>b
iε  is an output supply shock with mean zero 
and finite variance . The central bank sets inflation to maximizes the following 
quasi-linear utility function as in Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo (2005) and Muscatelli 
(1998): 
2
iεσ
2)](~[
2
1)( iiiiiii yycW εππ −−−=                                                                         (3.2) 
The parameter  in (3.2) is the weight placed by the central bank on its 
objective to stimulate output above the natural level of output. A greater value of  
indicates stronger preferences for stimulating output and less aversion to high 
inflation. These preferences are subject to shocks (such as unexpected pressures from 
the executive branch), i.e., 
ic
ic
i ic c vi= +  where  is a random variable with mean zero 
and variance
iv
2
ic
σ . Hence, there are two sources of uncertainty in the model: the shocks 
to output and the shocks to the decision making of the central bank. The shocks to 
preferences are assumed not correlated with the supply shocks within and across 
countries. The private sector forms expectations of inflation etπ  before the stochastic 
shocks are realized and the central bank sets inflation after the shocks are realized. 
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 The second term in (3.2) shows that deviations of inflation from the ideal level 
( )i iπ ε% are increasingly costly. Linearity of the objective function (3.2) in output 
generally implies no role for stabilization policy. We restore an implicit trade-off 
between the variability of inflation and output as in Muscatelli (1998) and Debrun, 
Masson, and Pattillo (2005) by making the socially optimal level of inflation a 
function of the supply shock: 0,)( >−= ηηεεπ ii . A negative supply shock induces 
the policymaker to tolerate positive inflation. Parameters subscripted i are country-
specific, while the parameters without subscripts are assumed identical across 
countries. 
 
Optimal Inflation under Monetary Autonomy 
With autonomous monetary policies, policymakers independently choose 
inflation rates by maximizing (3.2) subject to (3.1). The time-consistent inflation 
policy is derived under rational expectations assuming, as noted earlier, that expected 
inflation is formed before the shocks 
*
iπ
iε  and iν  are realized whereas the central bank 
sets inflation after the shocks are realized. However, once the shocks occur they are 
perfectly observable by all. The solution for optimal inflation24 yields: 
iiiii bcbc ηεεππ −=+= )(~*                                                                                   (3.3) 
The optimal inflation rate increases in the central bank’s preference for stimulating 
output (ci), in the marginal effect of unexpected inflation on output (b) and in the size 
of the output shock ( iε ). Knowing the central bank’s optimization problem, the 
rationally expected inflation rate is given by bci .  
                                                 
24 Both iε  and iν are stochastic and not correlated. Since it is assumed that these shocks are 
observable by both the CB and agents once they occur the set up used here reduces to a one period 
model, where each period the CB optimizes based on current shocks. We would require a multi-period 
set up if either or both of the shocks were only observable by the CB.  
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Optimal Inflation under Monetary Union 
Now, suppose that monetary policy is decided by a common central bank 
(CCB) in a multilateral monetary union of the n countries. The common central bank 
maximizes a weighted average of the individual policymakers’ utility functions: 
1
,
n
CCB
i i
i
U w
=
= ∑ U
1
                                                                                                   (3.4) 
where  and  is the weight given to country i in the decision-making 
of the common central bank. We can rewrite (3.4) as:  
0>iw
1
 
n
i
i
w
=
=∑
2)](~[
2
1)( AAAAA
CCB yycU εππ −−−= ,                                                               (3.4′) 
where subscript A  indicates cross country −w weighted averages. To isolate the pure 
effects of monetary unification on policy outcomes it is assumed that the CCB is 
under the same pressures as a national central bank would be, except that in a 
monetary union individual pressures on the CCB are diluted according to the weight 
of the country in the joint decision process.25 The time consistent optimal inflation 
values under monetary union are found by maximizing (3.4) to obtain : *muπ
)(~* AAmu bc εππ +=                                                                                             (3.5) 
The optimal inflation under monetary union is a function of the weighted 
output preferences of its members and the weighted supply shocks.       
 
 
 
                                                 
25 This differs from the literature, e.g., Alesina and Barro (2002) and  Alesina, Barro and 
Tenreyro (2002), that analyzes a monetary union as a process of dollarization in which the inflation 
prone country adopts the currency of the anchor country in a client-anchor relationship. 
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 Welfare Effects of Monetary Union 
The net welfare effect of moving from autonomous monetary policy to 
monetary union can be derived from the optimal inflation solutions obtained under 
autonomy and monetary union in (3.3) and (3.5). The expected net welfare ( ) 
effect of monetary integration for country i  is obtained from: 
NW
autonomyimuii EUEUNWE −=)(                                                                            (3.6) 
The workings for (3.6) are provided in appendix C3. By bringing together equations 
(C5) and (C8) we obtain: 
[ ]
iiii ccciicicii
wwwwbNWE −− −+−+−−= σσρσσ )1(2)1()1(2)(
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iiii cc
wbcccbw −−−−−− −− ]                                        (3.7)  
where subscript –i indicates a w-weighted average of all countries in the union 
excluding country i. Note that 
ii cccii
cc −=− σσρ),cov(  with 1 1cρ− ≤ ≤  being the 
coefficient of correlation of the central bank preferences across countries. 
Similarly,
iiii −=− εεε σσρεε ),cov( where  1 1ερ− ≤ ≤  is the correlation coefficient of 
the supply shocks across countries. A positive value for (3.7) means that welfare for 
country  is enhanced in a monetary union. i
The first and second lines in (3.7) account for the stochastic components of the 
net welfare function. The first line of (3.7) shows the effects of the uncertainty 
associated with the policymakers’ preferences for stimulating output. The key result 
regarding this part of the net welfare function is the effect of the correlation of these 
preferences across countries: 
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 0)1()( 2 <−−=∂
∂
−ii ccii
c
wwbNWE σσρ                                                                       (3.8) 
Expression (3.8) shows that the net benefit of a monetary union decreases in 
the correlation of the shocks to preferences. Intuitively, asymmetry of the shocks to 
output preferences across the member states allows the common central bank to 
achieve a lower variance of the union-wide inflation. The pressure to inflate and 
stimulate output (irrespective of output shocks) in some countries is counterbalanced 
by the desire for a more prudent policy of stable prices in other member countries at 
the same time. Furthermore, note from (3.8) that this benefit of checks by other 
member states is particularly strong if the individual central banks tend to experience 
large shocks to their objectives, i.e., if the cσ ’s are large.  
The second line of (3.7) shows the loss of welfare resulting from the reduced 
ability of individual central banks to react to economic shocks. This line is 
unambiguously negative, and is zero only if  and22
ii −= εε σσ 1=ερ , i.e., if the 
countries face the same shocks. This is the typical cost associated with monetary 
unions. Note that from (3.7): 
0)1()( 22 >−=∂
∂
−iiiw
NWE
εε
ε
σσηρ                                                          (3.9) 
i.e., the greater the correlation of output shocks across countries, the smaller is the 
cost associated with the loss of independent monetary policy. From (3.9), the 
synchronicity of supply shocks is particularly important if the member countries are 
prone to experience large shocks, i.e., if the εσ ’s are large.26  
                                                 
26 The effects of the correlations of supply shocks and preference shocks become even clearer 
if we consider a simplified case of two countries of equal weight, with 2 2 2
i iε ε εσ σ σ−= =  , 
2 2
i ic c
2
cσ σ σ−= =  and ic c−= i . Then, ( ) ( ) (2 2 2 21 4 1 1i c cE NW b )ε εσ ρ η σ ρ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= − − − .  It is apparent that 
expected net welfare increases in ερ  and decreases in cρ . 
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 The third line of (3.7) shows the nonstochastic component of the net welfare 
function. This line is composed of two parts. The first part is positive 
when 0<−− ii cc , implying that welfare increases for a country if it enters into 
monetary union with countries having greater aversion to high inflation. Thus, this 
part of the welfare function captures the benefits of imported monetary credibility: 
0])1([
)1()( 2 <+−−−=∂
∂
−
−
iiii
i
i
cwwc
a
bw
c
NWE                                           (3.10) 
The second part of the third line in (3.7), which is always negative, shows the loss 
from diverging output preferences in a monetary union. The greater the difference 
between the expected output preferences of country  and that of partner countries the 
greater the loss. Note also that the third line in (3.7) is zero when the expected output 
preferences of country i are the same as in the rest of the union, i.e., when 
i
ii cc =− .  
In summary, the net gain from monetary union for country i is greater if it 
joins in a union with other countries that have stronger expected preferences for low 
inflation (the imported credibility argument); if its output shocks are more highly 
correlated with those of the other union members; and if the shocks to its central 
bank’s preferences are correlated less with those of other member countries. The 
literature discusses the first and second of these effects, but has not identified the third 
one. Yet, it is an important effect because it shows that gains in monetary credibility 
are possible by forming a multilateral monetary union even if all of the member 
countries’ central banks face pressures to inflate provided that these pressures do not 
occur at the same time.  
The following sections use the model developed here to study the expected net 
benefits from forming a currency union for the East African countries. This group of 
countries is an ideal choice for study since they have made a significant effort towards 
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 monetary union. Given that none of these countries has a long history of independent 
monetary policy their experience fits our theoretical model well. 
 
Welfare Effects of an East African Monetary Union: An Application 
In this section we estimate the welfare effects of a move to monetary union for 
five East African countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. To 
derive estimates of the parameters ic and b  in (3.7), we adapt the approach in Swank 
(1997) to our welfare framework.27 In Swank’s model, the policy maker chooses 
nominal output to balance the objectives of low inflation and high output subject to a 
constraint based on the short-run Phillips curve (Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988). The 
reaction function derived from this optimization problem contains information about 
both the policy maker’s preferences and the economic constraint. To disentangle this 
information, the Phillips curve is first estimated and then the reaction function is 
estimated making use of the estimates of the Phillips curve. We adapt this method to 
the loss function in (2) to estimate the preferences parameter ic  and the marginal 
output gain from unexpected inflationb . The procedure is described in appendix D. 
To perform the estimations we use data on real and nominal GDP from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. The length of the data series, covering the period from 1990 onward, was 
kept short deliberately to capture relatively more recent developments in the five 
countries.28 We start obtaining regression results for the sub-sample covering the 
                                                 
27 Only a few other studies have developed methods to derive the preference parameter ( ), 
e.g., Krause and Mendez (2005), Cecchetti, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) and Favero and 
Rovelli (2003). 
ic
28 The prolonged civil war in Uganda until the late 1980’s makes these data unreliable around 
this period. Also in the 80’s, Tanzania underwent transition from a socialist regime to a market 
economy. Furthermore, the three EAC countries have steadily moved from high inflation regimes in the 
late 1980’s towards lower inflation through the nineties.  
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 period up to 2000. Then these are rolled, one year at a time, to obtain a series for the 
trade-off and preference parameters. For example, the first regression for Kenya 
covers the sub-period 1990 to 2000, the second regression 1991 to 2001, and so forth. 
These rolling regression results are used to obtain the variances and covariances for 
the preferences parameter. 
Next, with the same data series we identify the output shocks faced by the East 
Africa countries using the approach in Bayoumi and Ostry (1997). In particular, we 
regress the growth of real output (in logs) on its two lags. The residuals from this 
regression are taken to represent the underlying output disturbances.29 This allows us 
to estimate the variances 2 and
i
2
iε εσ σ − and the covariance ),cov( ii −εε of the shocks for 
each country. Finally, the weights ( ) are obtained from a four year average (from 
2000 to 2003) of the real GDP in U.S. dollars. We also try out alternative weights 
such as equal weighting of all member countries.   
iw
 
Results 
Table 14 shows the summary results for the various coefficients required to 
estimate the net welfare (3.7) for each of the five countries. The Table lists results for 
two scenarios. The first case is when the three core EAC countries (Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda) form a monetary union on their own and the second scenario is when all 
the five EA countries join in the union.   
The first row of Table 14 shows the estimated values for the marginal output gain 
from unexpected inflation ( ). These are obtained as in (D7′) of appendix D. The 
values of do not differ much among the countries ranging from around 0.1 to less 
b
b
                                                 
29 We also use the supply shocks from Buigut and Valev (2005) decomposed using the 
identification framework of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). The 
output shocks obtained from this method turn out to be only slightly smaller but otherwise give the 
same results.     
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 than 0.2. The second row of Table 14 shows the average output preference parameters 
( ic ) for the EA countries. These values reflect the weight placed on output 
stimulation relative to inflation. It is striking how different these preferences are 
among the EA countries. Uganda, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, places much higher 
weight on output relative to inflation compared to the other EA countries. 
Furthermore, row three in Table 14 shows that Uganda and Tanzania exhibit a much 
greater variation of their output preferences compared to the other three countries. 
The tolerance for high inflation (high ic ) along with the high variability of the 
preferences for inflation (high 2
ic
σ ) for Uganda and Tanzania suggest that these two 
countries are likely to gain from monetary union since they would face less inflation 
uncertainty in a monetary union than under autonomy. The fourth row of Table 14 
shows that the output shocks are substantially smaller compared to the shocks to 
preferences for each of the EA countries, i.e., most of the economic fluctuations in 
these countries are the result of policy shocks rather than output shocks. Therefore, 
the benefit of implementing more stable policies in a monetary union may outweigh 
the costs of losing independent monetary policy.30
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30Debrun, Masson and Pattillo (2005) found that in West Africa differences in the 
governments’ financing needs dominate the welfare function over the supply shocks. This suggests that 
policy shocks are more important in developing countries. A supra-national institution (a common 
central bank) would therefore be beneficial if designed to promote commitment to sound 
macroeconomic policies. 
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 Table 14. Estimates of Model Parameters for East Africa  
Country Burundi Rwanda Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
b  0.194 0.191 0.099 0.133 0.098 
ic  0.559 1.288 1.161 3.1741 6.585 
2
ic
σ  0.0290 2.9211 0.1230 5.1977 19.0588 
2
iεσ  0.0017 0.03965 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 
                                       
                                               Three-Country Union: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
ic−     4.5085 3.3025 2.2164 
2
ic−σ     8.7337 3.0379 1.3030 
Cov  ),( ii cc −   0.3428 3.1674 4.3030 
cρ    0.331 0.797 0.863 
2
i−εσ    0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
Cov ),( ii −εε    0.0001 0.0001 0.00007 
ερ    0.415 0.345 0.029 
 
               Five-Country Union: Adding Burundi And Rwanda 
ic−   3.12 3.19 4.03 3.00 2.09 
2
ic−σ   2.6777 3.2147 5.8243 2.0018 0.8041 
Cov  ),( ii cc − -0.1423 -2.1298 0.2835 2.4106 3.4285 
cρ  -0.510 -0.695 0.335 0.747 0.876 
2
i−εσ  0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 
Cov ),( ii −εε  0.00002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 
ερ  0.029 0.121 0.271 0.515 -0.285 
 
Looking at the remaining results in Table 14, notice that the correlations of the 
preferences shocks ( cρ ) across the three EAC countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda) are positive. However, the covariances  are not particularly 
large.  For the remaining two countries, Burundi and Rwanda, the correlations of the 
preferences shocks are actually negative. Therefore, overall a monetary union may 
provide a useful instrument for checks on the pressures to raise inflation in individual 
countries.  
),cov( ii cc −
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 The net welfare effects of a monetary union are presented in Table 15. We 
give the results when only the 3 EAC countries form a monetary union and when all 
the five EA countries join in the union. 
 
Table 15. Net Welfare from Monetary Union in East Africa  
 GDP weights Equal weights 
 Three-country union: Kenya, Tanzania, and Ugandaa
Kenya -0.095 -0.111 
Tanzania 0.010 0.010 
Uganda 0.380 0.348 
                      Five-country union: Adding Burundi and Rwandab
Burundi  -0.107 -0.075 
Kenya  -0.093 -0.131 
Rwanda  -0.084 -0.057 
Tanzania   0.031 0.035 
Uganda   0.463  0.469 
a The weights are (0.392, 0.370, 0.238) for the three-country union respectively; 
 b weights are (0.024, 0.357, 0.067, 0.336, 0.216) for the five-country union 
respectively.   
 
We also show the results of two scenarios regarding the decision making in the union. 
In the first case, the power exercised by each country is proportion to its economic 
size (GDP). In the second case, all countries exercise equal weights in the union.  
The net welfare effect of monetary union differs across the five countries. In 
all scenarios Uganda and Tanzania benefit from the union whereas Kenya, Burundi, 
and Rwanda seem to lose from a monetary union.31 Table 16 provides further insight 
into these results. The Table decomposes the net welfare (3.7) into three effects: the 
                                                 
31 Since b is assumed similar across the countries, we use a weighted average of 0.125 for the 
three EAC countries and 0.135 for all the five countries. The results in Table 15 are robust to changes 
in the values of andb η . Changing the value of b has no effect on the signs of the results for the 
countries that show negative net gain. It only changes the magnitude of the loss. However, for Uganda 
and Tanzania, very small values of  (less than 0.0024 and 0.0096 in the three-country case and less 
than 0.0036 and 0.0076 in the five-country case respectively) turn the positive net welfare gain in Table 
2 into a negative net gain. Compared to the estimated values of  (0.098 and 0.133 respectively) these 
are quite small. Changing the value of 
b
b
η increases the loss from supply shock asymmetry. However, 
the values of η needed to change the sign for the net gainers is large; greater than 13.1 and 53.1 in the 
three-country case and greater than 17.9 and 37.8 in the five-country case respectively. Finally, 
increasing the weight exercised by a country in the union decreases the net welfare loss for the 
countries that are net losers, and decreases the net gain for the net gainers. 
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 effect of the correlation of the shocks to preferences, the effect of the correlation of 
the shocks to output, and the effect of differences in the average output preferences 
across the countries. Essentially, the Table provides the estimated numerical values 
for the three lines in equation (3.7). Summing up the numbers from one row in Table 
16 gives the overall net gain in Table 15.32 Decomposing the net welfare allows us to 
investigate which of the effects influence it most strongly. The results are for the case 
of GDP-weighted decision making in the monetary union.    
Table 16 shows that the most important factor determining net welfare are the 
strong preferences for output stimulation in Uganda. This shows in the third column 
of Table 16 where the value for Uganda is positive and large indicating that Uganda 
would benefit from a monetary union with countries that display stronger aversion to 
high inflation. Conversely, most of the remaining countries would lose from a 
monetary union with a country that has a relatively poor inflationary record.  
 
Table 16. Decomposing the Net Welfare Gain from Monetary Union in East 
Africa 
                   Preference shocks           Output shocks           Mean preferences  
     Three-country union: Kenya, Tanzania, and Ugandaa
Kenya -0.0257                                -0.0008                      -0.0695 
Tanzania  0.0141                                -0.0001                      -0.0041 
Uganda  0.1228                                -0.0001                       0.2572 
                        Five-country union: Adding Burundi and Rwandab
Burundi  -0.0231                                -0.0009                      -0.0829 
Kenya -0.0223                                -0.0002                      -0.0705 
Rwanda  0.0035                                 -0.0171                      -0.0707 
Tanzania  0.0243                                 -0.0001                       0.0064            
Uganda  0.1514                                 -0.0003                       0.3122 
a The weights are (0.392, 0.370, 0.238) for the three-country union respectively; b 
weights are (0.024, 0.357, 0.067, 0.336, 0.216) for the five-country union 
respectively.   
 
                                                 
32 For example, the net gain from monetary union for Uganda is 0.1228 – 0.0001 + 0.2572 (in 
Table 16) = 0.38 (in Table 15). 
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 Table 16 also highlights the importance of the correlation of the shocks to 
preferences that is the main focus of this paper. Consider the case of Tanzania as an 
example. If the net benefit from a monetary union for Tanzania was determined only 
considering the cost of losing monetary policy (value -0.0001 in the second column of 
Table 16) and the “imported” credibility argument (value -0.0041 in the third column 
of Table 16) the overall net gain for Tanzania would be negative (-0.0001-0.0041 = -
0.0042). Adding the consideration of checks on individual countries’ policies by the 
union (value 0.0141 in Table 16) reverses this result into a positive net gain of 
0.010.33   
 
Conclusions 
This paper studies the implications of uncertainty regarding the central banks 
preferences for monetary union. We develop a model where the preferences of the 
central banks of potential member countries in a monetary union are subject to shocks 
(such as unexpected pressures to accommodate government objectives). We find that 
the net gain from monetary union for a country is greater if it joins in a union with 
other countries that have greater credibility for low inflation; if its output shocks are 
more highly correlated with those of the other union members; and if the shocks to its 
central bank’s preferences are correlated less with those of other member countries. 
The latter result occurs because the supranational central bank is able to even out the 
preference shocks across the member countries. While the literature has discussed the 
first two effects, it has not identified the third one.  
                                                 
33 Monetary union among the EA countries is not likely to produce a strong currency, and 
would likely require stabilization against major currencies. The euro has been suggested by a number 
of authors (Honohan and Lane 2000; Buigut and Valev 2005) as the most appropriate currency for an 
anchor. Though this is not the theme of our discussion here we do estimate the welfare effect of 
anchoring an EA currency to the euro. Our analysis shows that the net welfare for all the five countries 
is positive when the EA currency is linked to the euro.   
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 We use data from East Africa to calibrate the model and to estimate the 
expected gains from forming a monetary union in the East African Community. Such 
a union has been proposed and steps are being made for its implementation in the near 
future. Yet, not much economic analysis has been carried out to inform these policies. 
We find that two of the EA countries: Tanzania and Uganda will benefit from a 
monetary union whereas the remaining three countries Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda 
will lose.  
Clearly, there are additional considerations when discussing the potential 
benefits of an EAC monetary union. Nonetheless, our calibrations serve to highlight 
the importance of taking into account the shocks to central bank preferences when 
investigating the gains from monetary unions among developing countries. The model 
presented here or an expanded version that includes, for example, fiscal policy or 
multiple periods can be applied to other groupings of developing countries that have 
considered monetary union in other parts of Africa such as the SADC, in Latin 
America (MERCOSUR), or the transition countries of Eastern Europe.   
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Essay Four: Prospects for an East African Community (EAC) Monetary Union 
 
Introduction 
Monetary cooperation initiatives in independent East Africa go back to the 
East African Currency Board (EACB) arrangement that existed prior to independence. 
This was a continuation of a broader economic coordination scheme set up by the 
British colonial power in the three East African countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. The board arrangement was backed by the sterling pound and in practice 
each country held a veto over the EACB decisions (Guillaume and Stasavage 2000). 
Following the collapse of the EACB in 1966, each country introduced its own 
currency and soon thereafter abandoned the peg to the sterling pound. This was 
followed by the collapse of the EAC in 1977. The collapse of the old EAC has been 
attributed to a number of factors (Goldstein and Ndung'u 2001; Masson and Pattillo 
2005), key among them: (1) Differences relating to the distribution of benefits. 
Primarily Uganda and Tanzania felt that Kenya (the most industrialized of the three 
countries) benefited more from the arrangement and that the compensation 
mechanisms put in place to address the issue were not successful; (2) Ideological 
differences, with Tanzania and to a lesser extend Uganda leaning towards a more 
socialist path and Kenya towards a capitalist path, which led to divergent economic 
management and political distrust. 
The consequence of the collapse was that the assets of the old EAC were 
divided up. However, even during this period, the leaders of the three countries agreed 
on the need for future cooperation. The heads of the partner countries thus signed into 
the asset division mediation agreement a provision that allowed for the revival of the 
cooperation in some future time. This new effort was formalized with the 
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 establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Cooperation 
in 1993 which became operational with the launching of the East African Secretariat 
in 1996. In 1999 a treaty for the Establishment of an East African Community was 
ratified by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania34 and came into force in July 2000 with the 
objective of fostering a closer co-operation in political, economic, social, and cultural 
fields. An East Africa Customs Union protocol was signed in March 2004. A 
Common Market, a Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation of East 
Africa states are planned. 
Overall, an EAC monetary union seems viable. However, it is essential that 
the EA economies continue their efforts at achieving economic convergence. 
Furthermore, a discussion about the institutional framework of the union, the 
timetable for integration, and the legal background of the union has to take place. All 
of those would be facilitated by the creation of a supranational institution, an East 
Africa Monetary Institute, to coordinate the process of monetary union. We elaborate 
on these points in the rest of the chapter which is structured as follows. Section 2 
discusses the political and ideological developments in EA, while Sections 3 and 4 
analyze the economic benefits and costs of monetary union. Section 5 raises the 
possibility that the benefits of integration in EA may increase even further once the 
common currency is introduced. Section 6 discusses the recent achievements of the 
EA countries in lowering inflation and nominal interest rates. In Section 7 the 
framework for a monetary union is discussed and Section 8 suggests the way forward. 
A conclusion is provided in Section 9.  
 
                                                 
34The two neighboring countries, Rwanda and Burundi, have applied to join and the 
expectation is that they will be admitted soon. Their admission is basically dependent on the state of 
security in these countries affected by civil war in the mid nineties. There has been significant 
improvement in stability over the recent years. They are included in the study.  
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Political and Ideological Convergence in EA 
Economic integration is as much a political phenomenon as an economic one, 
if not more so. Integration is invariably seen as a way to achieve security and 
bargaining power and as a commitment mechanism for trade and other policy reform 
measures (World Bank 2000). A leading recent example is the creation of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) which is mainly a political construct (Eichengreen 
and Frieden 2001; Feldstein 1997). The EMU went ahead even though studies were 
not conclusive that these set of countries formed an optimum currency area (OCA). 
Similarly the development and the preservation of the CFA zone in West Africa was 
mostly political. The zone’s persistence has been attributed to the preferences of 
transnational French and African political and administrative elites for preserving the 
monetary union as a mechanism of political stability for Francophone African regimes 
(Stasavage 2003; Zhang, Sato, and McAleer 2004). Compared to the Franc zone (that 
has survived) the old EAC fulfilled more of the OCA criteria in terms of greater intra-
regional trade and labor mobility. However, the same level of transnational contacts 
was not maintained in Anglophone Africa as in Francophone Africa (ibid), which 
helps explain why the monetary link to the sterling pound failed.  
The collapse of the old EAC in the 70s and its reemergence in the 90s was 
largely political. Though asymmetry in the distribution of benefits of integration was 
at the root of the economic problems faced by the old EAC, ideological differences 
led to a particularly uneasy political climate at the time. Barely a year after the break-
up of the EAC this tension degenerated into a border dispute leading to the (1978 to 
 67
 1979) Tanzania-Uganda war.35 It is thus no wonder that the political establishments of 
the time could not tolerate the imbalances of the EAC, nor had the patience to try and 
work things out. 
Developments since then have made integration more appealing politically. 
The end of civil war in Uganda ushered in a change of regime in the mid eighties. 
This brought relative stability in the country. The failure and subsequent abandonment 
of Ujamaa-socialism in Tanzania has also permitted this country to move towards a 
more market-oriented path. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the introduction of 
economic reforms as a donor conditionality served to accelerate this process. Thus 
while the old EAC emphasized joint ownership and management of common services, 
the new strategy for cooperation emphasizes the role of the private sector and civil 
society. Another impetus for renewed effort at closer integration is the current 
prevalent view that Africa is increasingly being marginalized (Collier 1995). It is also 
the region most fragmented into small economies – a legacy of its colonial past. 
Integration schemes are seen as a way to improve bargaining power at such forums as 
the WTO and to enable them to cut better deals (ECA 2004; World Bank 2000).  
 Three issues are therefore likely to help foster closer integration in the EAC; 
(1) Increasing intra-regional trade and liberalization has underscored the importance 
of cross-border contagion from bad economic polices (Goldstein and Ndung'u 2001). 
Thus countries in the region are increasingly more interested in cross-border stability 
and good economic policies; (2) The growth of regional blocs around the world also 
means that regional cooperation in Africa is seen as a necessary counter-weight; (3) 
The collapse of the ideological divide in the region has ushered in political 
convergence and a measure of goodwill.  It is this political accord at the top that has 
                                                 
35 This led to the overthrow of Uganda’s president Idi Amin, and the installation of Yusuf 
Lule as president. However peace eluded Uganda till Yoweri Museveni and his national resistance 
army (NRA) toppled Tito Okello’s government and assumed control in January 1986.   
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 propelled the EAC. Participation from the civil society and the electorate has so far 
been minimal.36  
Some studies (Goldstein and Ndung'u 2001; Masson and Pattillo 2005) 
suggest that the existence of and the membership of EA countries in other competing 
integration schemes (i.e., SADC and COMESA) could act as exit options and make 
the EAC more fragile. However, it should be pointed out that these institutions are not 
close substitutes for the EAC. The objectives and the time frames to achieve the stated 
objectives are different. The EAC treaty offers, at least in theory, deeper economic 
and political integration options (ultimately a federation) than the others—in a shorter 
time frame. The group dynamics (cultural, language, and economic convergence) are 
more diverse for SADC and for COMESA, making negotiations and agreements 
harder on all fronts. Lack of progress in COMESA and to a lesser extent in SADC has 
been an issue. Furthermore, the EAC countries will have less influence in these larger 
entities.  
These partially explain why the new EAC emerged when all the three EAC 
countries were members of COMESA and Tanzania was also a member of SADC at 
the time. Since then Tanzania has pulled out of COMESA in 2000. Rather than look 
at the SADC and COMESA as alternatives, the EAC could act as a bench-mark in the 
larger framework if they could stay ahead in the integration process. This way the 
EAC could play the role of a monetary union nursery and have more say in shaping 
the direction of COMESA like the Rand zone is doing in the SADC. Nonetheless, the 
fact that there are other options just might allow for more sobriety in the negotiations 
and decisions within the EAC. The real danger to the EAC, we believe, still comes 
from the political landscape – the ability to sustain the still fragile political cohesion 
                                                 
36It is only in the Third EAC Development Strategy (2006-2010), currently under preparation, 
that consultation and sensitization of the people of East Africa on the political federation is expected to 
be launched.  
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 and to set up adequate structures for efficient functioning of the community. 
However, a monetary union would have enormous economic consequences for the 
EAC countries. These are discussed in the next two sections. 
 
The Economic Benefits of Monetary Union in East Africa 
Intra-Regional Trade 
In a monetary union the transaction costs of currency exchange and the 
uncertainty arising from exchange rate fluctuations between the member states are 
eliminated. More bilateral trade thus means greater benefits. Intra-regional trade in 
EA is still relatively low, but has been increasing with intra-regional exports rising 
from 6% in 1991 to 16% in 2001 and imports rising from 2.7% to 10.55% 
respectively (McIntyre 2005). This compares well with the level of trade in the 
ECOWAS, SADC, and is slightly less than trade in SACU (Masson and Pattillo 
2005). Table 17 shows that trade relations in the region are quite asymmetric. In 2004, 
the region absorbed 22% of Kenya’s and 23% of Uganda’s exports. Uganda is the 
single most important market for Kenyan goods while Kenya is the largest destination 
for Uganda’s goods within the region. Burundi and Rwanda also receive a large 
proportion of their imports (30% and 32% respectively) from Kenya.37  
Ackello-Ogutu and Echessa (1998) indicate that unrecorded trade is 
substantial in EA reaching 58% of total trade (recorded and unrecorded trade) 
between Tanzania and her neighbors for the 95/96 period. Ackello-Ogutu and Echessa 
(1997) estimate an even higher value (157%) for informal trade between Kenya and 
                                                 
37 Manufactures are important in the intra-regional trade. For example, McIntyre (2005) 
estimates that 11.5% of Kenya’s imports from Uganda and 43.4% of its imports from Tanzania were 
manufactures in 2001. For Uganda, 33.8% of its imports from Kenya and 71.3% of its imports from 
Tanzania were manufactures. Expansion of intra-regional trade is therefore crucial for the 
manufacturing sectors. 
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 Uganda during 1995. When this is taken into account intra-regional trade becomes a 
significant and growing aspect of EA relations. 
 
Table 17. Trade Relations (Exports and Imports) of EA Countries (2004) 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
 exp imp Exp imp exp imp exp imp Exp imp 
Burundi   0.83a 0.00b 0.23 0.65 1.74 0.00 1.98 0.00
Kenya 0.08 13.64   0.08 24.37 4.65 5.39 15.42 32.31
Rwanda 5.93 0.44 3.26 0.01   0.51 0.00 4.09 0.05
Tanzania 0.08 11.14 4.44 1.15 0.02 1.49   1.15 0.98
Uganda 2.07 5.60 13.17 2.01 0.17 6.33 1.02 0.29   
Africa 9.92 37.89 33.94 13.66 1.30 38.97 19.15 24.91 30.03 42.08
Industrial 
Countries 
49.16 49.05 43.16 35.97 7.90 29.66 42.61 31.53 49.65 31.29
Source: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics (2005). 
Note: a) 0.83% of Kenyan exports go to Burundi; b) 0% of imports come from 
Burundi.  
 
Furthermore, McIntyre (2005)and Busse and Shams (2003) show that the 
recent customs union will boost intra-region trade even further.38 Thus potential 
benefits from reduced transaction costs and reduced exchange rate risks could be 
significant and increasing. Outside the EAC, the European Union is the region’s main 
trading partner as a major destination for the EA’s primary products. 
 
Credibility from Agency of Restraint 
An important benefit of monetary union that has received prominence recently 
is the credibility argument. Monetary union creates the potential for some countries to 
import credibility from countries with greater reputation for more prudent monetary 
policy (Herrendorf 1997; Ozkan 1994). However, all of the EA countries lack a 
                                                 
38 The EAC customs union protocol is based on a three-band 0-10-25 percent (for raw 
materials, intermediate products and finished goods respectively) common external tariff over the next 
five years. However the removal of internal tariffs recognizes existing asymmetry in development 
among partner countries and requires the relatively more developed partner (Kenya) to open up faster. 
In turn the other two countries will phase out internal tariffs on a list of selected Kenyan goods over a 
period of five years (Masson and Pattillo 2005; McIntyre 2005). This list was a major sticking point in 
the negotiations and is one more indication that the success of the integration process will ultimately 
depend on the ability of the region to sustain the political goodwill. 
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 history of stable prices with none clearly superior in this regard. None of them can 
therefore take the role of an anchor. Therefore unless such a union is linked to an 
external anchor not much improvement in credibility can be expected. 
However, another argument for improved credibility more relevant to the EAC 
case (and developing countries generally) arises from the formation of a supranational 
monetary authority or a common central bank (CCB) acting as an agency of restraint. 
Monetary mismanagement in most African countries offers a strong case for the 
delegation of monetary policy to a suitable supranational monetary authority 
(Honohan and Lane 2000; Masson and Pattillo 2005). In EA, although monetary 
policy in the recent past has been better than in most other countries in the region, the 
conduct of monetary policy has often been subject to political interference. When 
monetary policy is ceded to a common central bank, the influence of any single 
government on the common central bank would be less than in the case of national 
central banks. This could enhance its independence and its ability to resist pressure for 
monetary financing (Buigut and Valev 2006; Masson and Pattillo 2005) forcing 
governments to adhere to more sound fiscal policy as well.  
 
Other Benefits 
In addition to reducing the cost of regional trade and promoting the prudence 
of monetary policy, a monetary union might lead to greater foreign direct investment. 
Larger markets within the union and better economic policy would create a more 
attractive climate for private investments. Regional cooperation on public goods such 
as shared resources, e.g., water basins, fisheries, and infrastructure, could lead to 
better utilization. McIntyre (2005) has noted that there is a lot of scope for 
cooperation in these areas, with the support of multilateral, bilateral and regional 
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 donor agencies. Furthermore, a monetary union reduces the need to maintain large 
liquid foreign exchange reserves that can be redirected to generate greater returns. 
Finally, pegging the exchange rates would help reduce relative price volatility 
(Gandolfo 2001) as all of the EAC countries are relatively open economies (see Table 
18). 
 
Table 18. Total Exports, Imports and Degree of Openness (Percentage) For EA 
Countries 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Burundi  Exports 8 9 9 6 8 7
Kenya  ,, 25 25 26 26 27 25
Rwanda  ,, 6 6 8 9 8 9
Tanzania  ,, 14 13 14 16 17 18
Uganda  ,, 10 12 11 12 12 12
Burundi  Imports 20 18 24 18 22 18
Kenya  ,, 33 31 36 36 28 29
Rwanda  ,, 23 23 24 25 25 28
Tanzania  ,, 28 26 23 25 25 27
Uganda  ,, 21 24 23 24 27 26
Kenya  openness 57 57 62 62 55 54
Rwanda  ,, 29 29 33 34 33 36
Tanzania  ,, 42 40 37 41 42 46
Uganda  ,, 30 37 34 36 38 39
Burundi  ,, 28 27 33 25 29 25
Source: Calculated from WDI (2005); Note: Openness is calculated as (Ex+Im)/GDP 
 
The Cost of Monetary Union─Loss of Independent Monetary Policy 
The major cost of monetary union is the loss of independent monetary policy. 
The member countries of a union have a common central bank and the same monetary 
policy applies to the entire union. This could be a problem if the business cycles of 
the member countries are not similar. A one-size-fits-all policy would not be suitable 
simultaneously for, say, Kenya which might be experiencing a recession and Tanzania 
which might be experiencing an expansion. Hence, in theory, only countries with 
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 similar business cycles (i.e., with positively correlated economic shocks) are good 
candidates for a monetary union.  
However, as Mundell (1961) explains the similarity of business cycles is less 
important if there is sufficient labor mobility among the countries so that the flow of 
people (from the recession country to the expansion country) can equalize economic 
conditions. Similarly, adjustment can be achieved if wages are flexible so that 
economic activity would shift to the recession country where wages have declined 
because of high unemployment. Finally, fiscal transfers between the countries (from 
the expansion country to the recession country) can help equalize economic 
conditions. How do the EAC countries score on these counts? 
 
The Similarity of Economic Fluctuations 
Some studies that have looked at the correlation of shocks in EA suggest 
qualified optimism. Using a Generalized purchasing power parity (G-PPP) model, 
Mkenda (2001) finds that the real exchange rates of the EAC countries are 
cointegrated for the period 1981-1998. Using a VAR model, Buigut and Valev (2005) 
decompose and analyze the supply and demand shocks for the EAC (Figures 3).  
 
Figure 3. Demand and Supply Shocks for EA Countries (1973 to 2001) 
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Figure 3 a). Demand Shocks for EA Countries (1973 to 2001) 
 
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Years
Sh
oc
ks
BurRs KenRs RwaRs TanRs UgaRs
 
Figure 3 b). Supply Shocks for EA Countries (1973 to 2001) 
Source: Buigut and Valev (2005), World Development 33(12). 
 
Overall, the correlations of the supply shocks across the EAC countries indicate 
asymmetry which could be attributed to their reliance on different primary products 
that are subject to varying international price shocks. Conversely, the demand shocks 
show a decline in volatility after the mid nineties and a weak positive correlation 
related to trade patterns. Furthermore, the impulse response functions to shocks are 
similar across the five countries. 
 
Labor Mobility and Wage Flexibility 
The costs associated with asymmetry of economic shocks would be lower if 
labor is mobile between countries and/or wages are flexible to allow for adjustment 
when the exchange rates are fixed. Labor mobility in the region and in general in 
Africa is believed to be high (Adepoju 2001). However, EA does not have free flow 
of labor yet. The existing EAC passport allows holders free travel within the 
community but it is not a substitute for a work permit. Individuals still need a work 
permit to be employed legally in another EAC country. Although labor mobility is a 
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 sensitive issue given the high level of unemployment, the EAC is currently 
negotiating a protocol39 on the free movement of persons, labor, and services. Its 
adoption will hopefully pave way for more cross-border labor flows. Shared 
languages and many cross-border communities are expected to help mobility once a 
framework on labor is in place.   
 The African labor markets generally have a dual labor market structure, with 
the formal sector being more rigid than the informal sector (Kingdom, Sandefur, and 
Teal 2005). The EA countries have wage laws with varying degrees of enforceability. 
For example, in Kenya strong union structures in the formal sector have succeeded in 
raising real wages after a period in which inflation eroded real wages (IMF 2003). 
However the informal sector, not covered by unions, has grown rapidly because of the 
failure of the formal sector to keep up with the growth in the labor force. High and 
growing unemployment is another source of downward pressure on wages.  
 
Fiscal Transfers 
An alternative way of adjustment when monetary policy is not available is 
through a social insurance scheme. A centralized budget or scheme for compensatory 
fiscal transfers across affected countries would alleviate the effects of differential 
shocks. However, this is not a viable option for the EA countries given their level of 
development. Another restraint is that the EA countries have high debts, which 
constrains fiscal adjustment at the national level.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The first meeting of the EAC high level task force (HLTF) took place March 2006. The 
targeted time-frame for completion is two years. Adoption of the protocol will upgrade the EAC 
customs union to a common market. 
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 Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria 
From an economic perspective, countries considering monetary union will 
weigh the benefits of integration related to lower transaction costs in bilateral trade 
and improved monetary policy credibility and the cost associated with foregoing 
monetary policy to dampen business cycles discussed in the previous two sections. 
However, using historical data to evaluate these criteria (as we did in the previous two 
sections) could be limiting in the sense that they are backward looking. Historical data 
do not reflect the switch in the policy regime (Mongelli 2005). Frankel and Rose 
(1998) have suggested that the conditions for evaluating whether a group of countries 
is a good candidate for monetary union (i.e., if the countries form an Optimum 
Currency Area) are endogenous. In particular, the reduced transaction costs could 
spur trade among countries that had not traded extensively in the past. Furthermore, 
greater trade links may promote greater synchronicity of business cycles. Thus 
countries may be better candidates for monetary integration ex-post rather than ex-
ante.40  
Although trade is probably boosted by forming a monetary union, the size of 
the effect is not clear. A meta-analysis by Rose and Stanley (2005) rejects the 
hypothesis that there is no effect of currency union on trade. The combined estimates 
imply that a currency union increases bilateral trade by between 30% and 90%. De 
Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) estimates that the trade effect of monetary union ranges 
from a few percentage points to over 100 percent with respect to the EMU. Further 
evidence is obtained from the CFA zone where Fielding and Shields (2004) find that 
trade was greater than what would otherwise have been expected without the currency 
union.  
                                                 
40 De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) examine other sources of endogeneity of OCA e.g., 
endogeneity of financial integration. 
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 The next question is whether greater trade makes the business cycles more 
similar. From a theoretical perspective the effect of increased trade from integration 
on cross-country correlation of business cycles is ambiguous. It is possible that 
reduced trade barriers could lead to more specialization according to comparative 
advantage and therefore more asymmetry (Krugman 1993). Conversely, increased 
integration may result in more highly correlated business shocks because of common 
demand shocks and intra-industry trade. De Grauwe (2003) supports this second view, 
suggesting that although concentration may occur, deeper integration reduces the 
importance of national borders increasing the likelihood that clusters of economic 
activity will transgress national borders. Similarly, Fidrmuc (2004) shows that intra-
industry trade induces convergence of business cycles in the OECD countries. Higher 
intra-industry trade indicates that there is scope to realize gains from specialization in 
differentiated products.  However intra-industry trade is more important in developed 
countries than in developing countries. It is non existent among many African 
countries, largely due to the fact that exports among African countries are highly 
concentrated in very similar primary products which limits the gains from exchange 
(Simuyemba 2000). Therefore, although some increase in trade is predicted for EA 
from deeper integration it is not clear what will be the effect on business cycle 
convergence.  
Besides a trade channel, Artis (2003) argues that eliminating independent 
monetary policy can further increase the similarity of business cycles across countries 
since idiosyncratic policy is a prime source of idiosyncratic shocks. With a common 
monetary policy this source of idiosyncrasy would disappear. This probably will be an 
important benefit for EA where executive interference in monetary policy is 
substantial. This argument would be in line with the view raised in the literature 
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 (Guillaume and Stasavage 2000) that common central banks could act as agents of 
restraint in Africa. This is because African countries have generally lacked checks and 
balances in their political institutions that are necessary for the conduct of credible 
monetary policy at the national level. 
 
A Look at Some Convergence Criteria 
To achieve stable monetary union member countries need to follow national 
policies that will ensure credibility and durability of the union. Evidence for such 
policies must exist before forming the union. Essentially, this requires relatively small 
budget deficits and low levels of government debt. Getting public finances in order 
helps achieve prudence in monetary policy evidenced by low inflation and relatively 
low nominal interest rates. This helps stabilize nominal exchange rates so that the 
transition to irrevocably fixed rates in the union is smooth. Has such convergence 
occurred in EA?  
 
Public Finances 
Figure 4 shows that Kenya and Tanzania have relatively low budget deficits 
(less than 5% of GDP) when the deficit is defined to include grants. If, however, 
grants are excluded on the grounds that they have been unreliable and therefore a 
source of shocks, then Kenya is the only country with a relatively small budget 
deficit. The other countries need to lower their deficits.  
 
 
 
 
 79
 Figure 4. Budget Deficits (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 4(a): Budget Deficit when Grants are Included (Percentage of GDP) 
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Figure 4(b): Budget Deficit when Grants are Excluded (Percentage of GDP) 
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     Source: Calculated from International Finance Statistics (2005) 
 
Table 19 and Figure 5 further emphasize the aid dependency of the EA 
countries. Kenya is the only country that relies relatively little on aid, followed by 
Tanzania. Furthermore, all of the EA countries are relatively highly indebted and most 
of the debt is external and denominated in foreign currencies. This provides a strong 
disincentive to using exchange rate policy to respond to economic shocks. Thus the 
EA countries need to reduce the debt burden in order to reduce the incentives for 
future inflation and to reduce the limitations on exchange rate policy. A sustained 
fiscal deficit reduction effort is needed to reduce both the domestic debt and the 
external debt.  
 80
  
Figure 5 Dependency on External Grants by EA Countries 
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Source: Calculated from International Finance Statistics (2005). 
 
 
Table 19. Debt and Aid Dependency (percentage) Indicators for EA Countries 
(2001) 
Debt & Aid Kenya Burundi Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Total external debt/Exports  192.9 1842.7 787.3 451.0 552.6 
Total External debt/GNI 51.9 156.8 76.3 71.9 67.4 
Total debt service/Exports 15.4 39.8 11.3 10.3 7.4 
Total debt/GNI 70 170 86.4 - 73 
Domestic debt/Total debt 35 8.3 13.2 - 7.7 
Aid per capita 15 19 33 36 34 
Aid as percentage of GNI 4.0 19.3 17.3 13.3 14.1 
Aid (percentage of cross  
capital formation) 
31.1 274.3 92.7 77.7 40.5 
Source: Buigut and Valev (2005), World Development 33(12). 
 
 Inflation and Interest Rates 
Figure 6 shows a significant convergence in inflation over the last few years. 
The EA countries have succeeded in reducing inflation to single digits (or close) from 
relatively high double digits in the early nineties. Tanzania for example has made 
remarkable achievements bringing down inflation from about 30% in the mid nineties 
to less than 5% in 2004.41 The other countries need to do a bit more to achieve their 
                                                 
41 Some stated macroeconomics convergence targets for The Second EAC Development 
Strategy 2001-2005, http://www.eac.int/documents/Development%20Strategy.pdf  (accessed March 
2006) include; Real GDP growth rate of at least 7%; Inflation of less than 5%; Lower ratio of current 
account deficit; Reduction of fiscal deficit to less than 5%; Maintaining reserves at least 6 months 
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 stated goal of 5%. Similarly, Figure 7 shows marked achievement of convergence in 
interest rates in EA. The nominal interest rates have been declining over the last 
decade from highs (in the twenties to thirties) in the early and mid nineties converging 
to around 10%-15% in 2004. Stability, however, remains an issue. The EA countries 
need to sustain this single digit inflation rates and to reduce the fluctuations.  
 
Figure 6. Convergence of Inflation Rates in EA: Annual Changes in CPI (Base Year 
2000) 
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Source: Calculated from International Financial Statistics (2005) 
 
Figure 7. Convergence of Nominal Interest Rates in EA Countries 
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Source: International Financial Statistics (2005). 
                                                                                                                                            
equivalent of normal imports; Scaling up the ratio of domestic savings to GDP of at least 20%; 
Undertake debt reduction initiatives and maintaining the fiscal burden of serving the external 
obligations to less than 15% 
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 Note: Lending rates (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda), Discount rate 
(Rwanda) 
 
Exchange Rates 
Figure 8 and 9 show that the bilateral nominal and real exchange rates 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have been volatile. Hence, it seems that 
finding a lock-in rate (or tight band of fluctuations) would be hard right now. Another 
issue is that these currencies are not currently freely floating. They have been defined 
as independent and managed floats (Masson and Pattillo 2005). This raises the 
question of what exchange rate the currencies would be allowed to lock-in at. To 
avoid strategic manipulation, the currencies probably need to be allowed to freely 
float against major currencies for a while to determine the bilateral lock-in rates. 
However, currently the “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) is an incentive 
for managed float systems. 
 
Figure 8. Quarterly Percentage Fluctuations in the EAC Bilateral Nominal Exchange 
Rates 
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Figure 9. Quarterly Percentage Fluctuations in the EAC Bilateral Real Exchange 
Rates 
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Source: Calculated from International Financial Statistics (2005) 
 
 
Overall, the evidence presented here suggests that the EA countries have made 
important progress in terms of the convergence criteria but still face significant 
challenges. Formulating explicit goals regarding public finances, monetary policy, 
and exchange rate policy and getting on a timetable for achieving these goals is 
essential to keep the monetary union plans on track. But what kind of a monetary 
framework should the EAC adopt if a monetary union is pursued? The options are 
analyzed below. 
 
Framework for Monetary Policy in the Union 
Peg to the Euro? 
A key issue to be handled if a monetary union is instituted is the framework 
such a system would take to be able to credibly deliver the primary objective of price 
stability. Due to the region’s significant trade and financial links to the EU most 
studies suggest the euro as an external anchor for the region. Eliminating exchange 
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 rate fluctuations versus the euro may lead to substantial gains. Furthermore, linking 
the EA currency to the euro would lower inflation and increase the long-term 
credibility of monetary policy. This probably would be the most important gain, given 
that the national central banks in the EA countries have not had a good track record of 
prudent monetary policy management. 
There are, however, important considerations against a peg to the euro as well. 
First, the EAC and the U.K. also have large trade and financial relations that go back 
to colonial times. So the attractiveness of a link to the euro is undermined if the U.K. 
stays out of the euro-zone. In addition, some of the primary commodities exported by 
the EA countries are traded in dollars internationally. Appreciation of the euro could 
lead to loss of competitiveness of EA products against competing exporters and 
ultimately to more unemployment in economies already grappling with high 
unemployment. The experience of the CFA zone in the 1990’s is an example of this 
risk. As Adam, Bevan, and Chambas (2001) and Nashashibi and Bazzoni (1994) 
describe real exchange rate misalignment was a major factor in the deterioration of 
fiscal performance in the CFA zone during the second half of the 80s and early 
nineties. The misalignment arose from cross-rate fluctuations, with the French Franc 
appreciating against the U.S. dollar. The corrections in exchange rates that often 
follow such misalignments are associated with a period of turmoil and with 
tremendous real economic costs (Valesco 2000).42
                                                 
42 The CFA though pegged to the French franc did not achieve fiscal discipline in the 80s and 
90s. The region actually performed worse than the non CFA Sub-Saharan Africa in the mid eighties. 
Governments pushed state-owned banks to lend to public enterprises (to keep the transactions off the 
fiscal account). Eventually the unsustainable macroeconomic policy in the CFA led to 50% devaluation 
in 1994. However, without the support of the French treasury the devaluation would probably have 
happened much earlier. Thus an external guarantor could have both positive and negative effects on the 
promotion of fiscal discipline. The positive side is that it provides external surveillance. But there is the 
potential for moral hazard related to bail-outs and partial funding of fiscal indiscipline (Stasavage 
1997). Masson and Pattillo (2002) argues that in this period political interests in France were more 
interested in preserving the zone and assuring short-term political stability of heads of state than in 
forcing fiscal adjustment. The same political interests could not support the application of strict rules 
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 A second concern is that economic shocks in the euro-area and in the EAC 
show very little symmetry (Buigut and Valev 2005). Hence, the monetary policies of 
the European Central Bank would seldom fit the needs of the EA countries. In 
addition, in an asymmetric system (anchor-client peg) business cycles in the periphery 
countries (EAC in this case) are likely to be made more volatile by the pro-cyclical 
movements of the money stock in the periphery countries (De Grauwe 2003).  
It also has to be mentioned that although the euro is oft cited in the literature 
as the appropriate currency to peg to, this has not received any discussion in the 
political arena within the EAC. It is not possible to determine at this stage whether the 
idea of a link to the euro would receive the political goodwill required or nationalism 
would prevail. This is important since the EAC integration, as stated earlier, is 
propelled by political dynamics.  
 
Inflation Targeting 
If the decision is to create a single currency that would float independently, 
then right at the outset the principle of independence of the supranational body has to 
be fully accepted and structures to insulate it from the political system would be 
needed. To avoid political intrigues transparency would need to be built into the 
functioning of such an institution. A number of small to medium-sized economies 
starting with New Zealand (others include Australia, the U.K., Canada and more 
recently South Africa) have successfully used inflation targeting (IT) as a way to 
achieve price stability and credibility, as well as accountability and transparency of 
monetary policy.  
                                                                                                                                            
since these would have put the francophone African regimes in precarious positions. This raises the 
question whether the CFA would have survived this long if strict fiscal rules were applied. 
 
 86
 The experience of New Zealand, a country that had no tradition of central 
bank independence, is that the regime brought down inflation from 9% in 1988 to less 
than 2% in 1991 with a decline in output volatility as compared to the previous two 
decades (Brash 2002). An inflation target is agreed upon by the central bank governor 
and the Minister of Finance. The central bank is accountable for delivering the target 
with the governor, by legislation, at risk of losing his job for inadequate performance. 
Such a requirement in the EAC case could help ensure that the common central bank 
leadership has incentive to resist political pressure. Mutual agreement on the inflation 
target, as in the case of New Zealand, would shield the common central bank from 
undue criticism from the governments. On the African continent, South Africa 
adopted an explicit IT regime in 2000 and has achieved some success (van der Merwe 
2004) though the period is too short for a verdict.   
The requirement for an IT system is that the common central bank will have 
only a single mandate – that of price stability. Currently the three EAC central banks 
(in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) all list price stability as their primary objective 
(although they also have other secondary sub-objectives).43 In fact the Bank of 
Tanzania clearly states the reason for emphasis on the price objective: that the 
multiple objectives approach has not been such a success in the past. Recent efforts in 
reducing inflation to (or near) single digits show that IT will not be an alien idea 
politically. The assessment of an optimal inflation target may be more complex for 
developing countries mainly because the benefits of low inflation have rarely been 
quantified or related to numerical values (Masson, Savastano, and Sharma 1997). 
However, Brash (2002) argues that the core elements of inflation targeting are not 
                                                 
43 http://www.centralbank.go.ke/about/objectives.html, http://www.bot-
tz.org/AboutBOT/BOT_Function.htm, http://www.bou.or.ug/about.htm; accessed March 2006 
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 particularly complex, or more complex than operating other approaches to monetary 
policy. 
 An additional (political) argument for a floating currency has to do with the 
African Union objective of closer integration. If the agenda is to use the regional 
blocs as a stepping stone for an eventual African monetary union, then this may be an 
opportunity to build the institutional structure needed to allow for eventual expansion 
of the EAC, e.g., to encompass the COMESA region. The EAC could thus be 
considered as a sort of currency union nursery, a learning centre as it were. 
 
The Way Forward for EAC Monetary Integration 
The process of forming a monetary union is a demanding endeavor. To 
achieve a smooth transition cogent planning and implementation will be needed. What 
is critically needed now is for the EAC secretariat and governments to vest the 
technical process of the monetary union to a central professional organ. Such an 
organ, an East African Monetary Institute (EAMI), would consolidate research and 
carry out the planning and implementation of the monetary process. The EAMI would 
act as the forerunner of an East African Central Bank. Coordination of monetary 
policy and decisions such as the convergence targets, time-frame, and issues of lock-
in rates for the exchange rates would be made within such a structure. Other key 
decisions such as the legal framework of introduction of a new currency, the decision 
on the best framework to be adopted for the new currency (link to euro, IT, etc), bank 
supervision in the joint system, and organizational framework for the East African 
Central Bank would also fall under its purview.   
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 Conclusion 
The EAC shows a fair degree of linkages. Intra-regional trade is substantial 
and growing. The official estimates understate the true volume of trade because 
unrecorded trade is high in the region. In addition estimates indicate that the 
implementation of the customs union will have positive trade effects for the region. 
Thus potential benefits from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate risks could 
be significant and increasing. The symmetry of shocks is low, but demand shocks 
show symmetry related to trade linkages. Labor mobility in the region and in Africa 
generally is believed to be high. The protocol on factor mobility currently being 
negotiated, and the similarity in language and culture are expected to improve labor 
flows. Hence, the cost of losing independent monetary policy may not be so great. 
Furthermore, this cost might be minimal if we consider that these countries have not 
shown a particularly good record of monetary prudence. This becomes more relevant 
if the structure of a supranational central bank allowed for a more credible system. 
The existing political accord in the region is also a big plus for the process. Overall 
the idea of monetary union in the EAC seems potentially viable. 
 However, although some remarkable progress has been made towards 
convergence in a relatively short time, more needs to be done. More effort is needed 
to achieve inflation and interest rate convergence. Similarly, more effort is needed to 
achieve sustainable fiscal policy in terms of fiscal deficits and debt management. 
Unlike trade issues that could be handled by the relevant ministries, monetary union 
will involve establishing a new supranational institution to oversee the transition and 
eventually be in charge of monetary policy. The groundwork for this has not started 
and will need time to set up. Chief among the issues to be assessed by such an 
institute is the framework such a system will eventually take. A number of papers 
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 have advocated a peg to the euro, but some inherent weaknesses of such a system and 
the experiences of several economies over the last decade suggest that an inflation 
targeting system merits a serious look as an alternative. So far the process of 
integration has been a political agenda. This process therefore needs to cultivate and 
gain public support in all the member countries for legitimacy and long term stability.  
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 Appendix A: Identification of Supply and Demand Shocks by VAR 
We assume that fluctuations in real output {yt} and the price level {pt} are the 
result of two underlying types of shocks: supply and demand shocks. Assume that the 
variables are unit root, so that the vector Xt ≡ is stationary. The joint process of 
two variables (
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ
t
t
p
y
tyΔ  and ) can be represented by an infinite moving average 
representation of a vector of the two variables and an equal number of structural 
shocks. Let ε
tpΔ
t be the vector of demand and supply shocks, (εdt, εst ).  Formally, the 
bivariate moving average of Xt can be represented as: 
Xt ≡    = ∑                                              (A1) ∑∞
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which is equation (1) in main text. Δyt and Δpt represent changes in the log of output 
and prices and L is the lag operator. Ai represents the impulse response function of the 
shocks to the elements of the vector Xt, and  εdt, εst are independent white noise supply 
and demand shocks normalized so that Var(εt)=I. To decompose the shocks, the AD-
AS framework assumes that demand shocks do not have any effect on output in the 
long-run. Thus, the cumulative effect of demand shocks on the change of the log of 
output (Δyt) must be zero: 
∑∞
=
=
0i
i11 0a                                                                                                               (A2) 
The supply side and demand side shocks can be recovered from estimating a finite 
order VAR. The optimal lag length (p) is chosen such that its residuals approximate 
white noise. Each element of vector Xt is regressed on lagged values of all the 
elements of Xt: 
tptpttt eXXXKX +Φ++Φ+Φ+= −−− ...2211 ,                                                    (A3) 
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 where K denotes a vector of constants, Φis are the coefficients from the estimating 
equation and et is a vector of the residuals . The vector e⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
pt
yt
e
e
t is a composite of 
demand and supply shocks. If the process is covariance stationary we can take 
expectations of (A3) to calculate the mean μ of the process: 
μμμμ pK Φ++Φ+Φ+= ...21                                                                             (A4) 
Subtracting (A4) from (A3) gives (A3) in terms of deviations from the mean: 
tptpttt eXXXX +−Φ++−Φ+−Φ=− −−− )(...)()( 2211 μμμμ                          (A5) 
The VAR(p) in (A5) can be represented as a VAR(1) process. To do this, define: 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
≡
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡ ΦΦΦ
≡
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
−
≡
+−
−
0
.
.
0
,
0.....0
.
.
....0
......
,
.
.
2
2
21
1
1
t
t
p
pt
t
t
t
e
V
I
I
F
X
X
X
μ
μ
μ
ξ  
Then (A5) can be written as VAR(1): 
t1tt VF +ξ=ξ −                                                                                                       (A6) 
and recursive substitution of (A6) implies that: 
                                        (A7) t
s
t
s
stststst FVFVFFVV ξξ +++++= +−−+−+++ 11221 .....
If the eigenvalues of F all lie inside the unit root circle, then Fs → 0 as s → ∞ and the 
VAR is covariance stationary (Hamilton 1994). The first two rows of (A7) then give 
the vector moving average (∞) representation of Xt : 
 Xt =  μ+ et + C1et-1 + C2et-2 + C3et-3 + C3et-3 + C4et-4 …..                                     (A8) 
where Cj =F11(j) and F11(j) denotes the upper left block of  Fj which is the matrix F 
raised to the jth power. Equations (A1) and (A8) yield the relationship between the 
estimated residuals (et) and the structural shocks (εt): 
 92
 et = A0εt                                                                                                                (A9) 
Therefore we need to know the elements of A0 to calculate the underlying 
structural supply and demand shocks. The variance-covariance matrix of residuals 
( ) 00 )( AAee tttt ′′Ε=′Ε εε and the Cis are known from estimation. To recover the four 
elements of A0 in the two-by-two case we need four restrictions. Two are simple 
normalizations which define the variances of εdt, and εst (usually to one). Since εdt, and 
εst are deemed to be pure shocks, a third restriction applied is to assume that demand 
and supply shocks are orthogonal so that E(εdt εst) = 0 (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 
1992). E ( )ttεε ′  then drops out as I2, and we have E ( )ttee ′  = Ω = 00 AA ′ .  The variance-
covariance matrix of residuals (Ω) is a known symmetric matrix. From this we obtain 
the following three restrictions: 
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The final restriction is to impose the condition that demand shocks have no long term 
effects on output as in (A2). In terms of the VAR this implies: 
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0i i22i21
i12i11                                                                      (A11) 
These restrictions allow the matrix A0 to be uniquely defined and hence the demand 
and supply shocks to be identified.  
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 Appendix B: Eigenvalue Stability 
Table A1: Eigenvalue stability condition. 
Kenya  -0.4641 .07157 + .4228i .07157 - .4228i 0.14065 
Tanzania   .3476 + .3642i .3476 - .3642i 0.3284 -0.1039 
Uganda  .6551 + .05270i .6551 - .0527i -0.405 -0.0182 
Burundi  0.51663 -0.3575 .0991 + .5520i .0991 - .5520i
Rwanda  -0.5353 .1241 + .4022i .1241 - .4022i 0.33329 
France  0.9496 -0.4044 .2261 +.1985i .2261 -.1985i 
Germany 0.3823 .3521 +.3478i .3521 -.3478i -0.2265 
Italy  0.9309 -0.0135+.4237i -0.0135-.4237i 0.3025 
U.K.  0.8346 .1833 +.4660i .1833 -.4660i -0.1883 
U.S. 0.9335 .2656 +.6196i .2656 -.6196i -0.3028 
Euro-bloc 0.9289 0.1564+.4263i 0.1564-.4263i -0.0586 
Note: All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.  
 
The eigenvalues λ of the matrix F in (A6) satisfy:   
 
0.....11 =Φ−−Φ− − pppnI λλ . For p=2 we have 0212 =Φ−Φ− λλnI  
The VAR is covariance stationary as long as |λ |<1 so that the consequences of (εt) 
eventually die out. The VAR satisfies this stability condition.  
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 Appendix C: The Welfare Effects of Monetary Unification 
The expected net welfare of monetary union for country i is given by: 
( )G G Gi i MU i AutonomyE NW EU EU≡ −                                                                    (C1a) 
This can be written as:  
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Using, , we can rewrite (C1b) as: 2 2( ) [ ( )] (E Q E Q Var Q= + )
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, iautiiauti VarE εππεππ −−−−−                                          (C2)   
 
STOCHASTIC COMPONENT 
Net welfare for the stochastic component (SW) of (C2) is given by: 
))}(~())(~({
2
1)( , iautiimui VarVarSWE εππεππ −−−−=                                         (C3) 
Using the solutions for optimal inflation (3) and (5), we have: 
[ ]1( ) { ( ) ( )
2i A A i
[ ]}iE SW Var bc Var bcπ ε π ε= − + − −% %                                              (C4) 
Now, we can write the aggregate stochastic variable  as a 
weighted average of the supply shock to country i and the weighted average supply 
shocks of all other member countries excluding country i:  
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Similarly we can write iiiiA cwcwc −−+= )1(                                                      (C4b) 
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 where i−ε  ( ) is the weighted average of supply shocks (output preference) across 
the  other union members. Thus writing the cross-country aggregate shock 
ic−
1−n Aε  
and the shocks to preferences  as in (C4a) and (C4b), and assuming that the 
preferences and the supply shocks are not correlated we obtain:  
Ac
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2
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22
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i ii
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 [ ]),cov()1(2)1()1(
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2222
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ii −−+−+−− −σσ                 (C5) 
 
NONSTOCHASTIC PART 
The non-stochastic part of the net welfare is given by: 
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which reduces to: 
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But 2***2* )]](~[[)]](~[[ iiimuimu EE εππππεππ −+−≡− . Let ii Acb ,π= and 
iiA cbcb ,πΔ=− . Hence we can write (C6) as: 
)}]{([
2
1 2
,
2
,, iii AA πππ −+Δ− ]}2{[2
1 2
,,, iiiA πππ Δ+Δ−=                                           (C7) 
The net welfare for the non-stochastic part becomes:  
[ ][ ] [ }()(2{
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iAiAi ccbccbcb −+−− ] , which using (C4b) yields; 
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Combining (C5) and (C8) yields equation (7) in the text.  
 
 96
 Appendix D: Deriving the Estimates of Parameters b And  ic
The policy maker is assumed to care about economic growth and inflation. The 
welfare function describing the policymaker’s preferences is given as in (2) in the text 
by; 
2
,,, )(~(2
1)~( tititiii yycW εππ −−−=                                                                    (D1) 
where  is the log of real output. Each period the policymaker plans to achieve a 
particular nominal growth rate ; 
ty
d
txΔ
xt
d
tt xx ε+Δ=Δ ,                                                                                                  (D2) 
Actual nominal output growth txΔ  may differ from the planned nominal output. As in 
(Ball, Mankiw and Romer 1988), we express the short-run output inflation trade-off 
as: 
ytttt xyty εαααα +Δ+++= − 41321                                                            (D3) 
The log of the real GDP is regressed on its own lag, a time trend, and the change in 
the nominal GDP. Thus change in real output is given by; 
ytttt xyty εαααα +Δ+−++=Δ − 41321 )1(                                                           (D4) 
The coefficient of the change in nominal demand ( 4α ) tells how much of a shock to 
nominal GDP shows up in output in the first year. If 14 =α , then all of the change in 
nominal GDP shows up in real GDP; and if  04 =α , then all the change in nominal 
GDP shows up in inflation. Since inflation is defined as ttt yx Δ−Δ=π , then the 
inflation rate can be written as; 
ttt hx −Δ−= )1( 4απ , where yttt yth εααα +−++= −1321 )1(                             (D5) 
The policy maker optimizes (D1) with respect to , subject to (D2), (D4) and (D5) 
to yield: 
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Equation (D6) expresses the policy maker’s reaction to the desired growth rate of real 
output and which represents the past development of real output growth. eth
Following the two-step estimation procedure in Swank (1997), we first 
estimate the economic constraint (D3). From these estimates we calculate , which 
then allows us to estimate the reaction function of nominal demand (D6) with the 
coefficient on  constrained to be 
e
th
e
th
41
1
α− . The results from (D6) allow  to be 
calculated. This value allows us to estimate the
ic
ic , ic−  , and . ),cov( ii cc −
In addition, from ttt yx Δ−Δ=π  and (D4) the value of b in (7) in the text can 
be approximated. By writing pΔ=π then from ttt yx Δ−Δ=π  we get: 
x
p
x
y
Δ
Δ−==Δ
Δ 14α                                                                                                 (D7)  
From (1) in text,
*πΔ
Δ
Δ
Δ= p
p
yb  where *π  is unexpected inflation. By appropriately 
rebasing prices we have 1
*
=Δ
Δ
π
p . Therefore we approximate b  from the following 
equation; 
4
4
1
1 α
α
−=−Δ
Δ=Δ
Δ=
p
x
p
yb                                                                                    (D7′) 
Thus the value of  can be estimated from (D7′). The weighted average of these 
values for the five East African countries is used as an estimate of the cross-country 
value. 
b
b
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